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ABSTRACT
This Article reviews the conceptual and doctrinal roles of
the foreseeability doctrine in negligence law, and analyzes its
application in cases where a new technology or unexplored
scientific principle contributed to a plaintiff’s harm. It adopts
the common law definition of foreseeability as a systematic
relationship between a defendant’s wrongdoing and the
plaintiff’s harm, and demonstrates translation of the concept
into the language of science so that the common law meaning of
the foreseeability doctrine is preserved. An analysis of the
foreseeability of HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk illustrates
application of the concept to contemporary issues in medical
science.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreseeability is a pervasive and vital ingredient of the law
of torts.1 Although jurists have lamented foreseeability as an
elusive and frequently manipulated concept, the doctrine plays
important conceptual and doctrinal roles in negligence law, and
is considered the dominant test of proximate cause. 2 The basic
test of foreseeability can be described as “whether one can see a
systematic relationship between the type of accident that the
plaintiff suffered and . . . the defendant’s [wrongdoing].”3
This Article reviews the conceptual and doctrinal roles of
the foreseeability doctrine in negligence law, and analyzes its
application in cases where a new technology or unexplored
scientific principle contributed to a plaintiff’s harm. The
foreseeability issue in such cases is governed by the Reasonable
Ignorance of the Relationship doctrine of proximate causality.4
Under the doctrine a defendant escapes liability if scientists
could not predict, ex ante, the systematic relationship between
the defendant’s wrongdoing and plaintiff’s harm.5
The Reasonable Ignorance doctrine is illustrated by
Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co. 6 In Doughty, a
technician negligently knocked the cover of a vat made of
sindanyo, a combination of cement and asbestos, into liquid
1. See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1277, 1277 (2009).
2. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 363 (Clarendon Press 1997) (“The dominant test of proximate cause in
torts makes a defendant liable when but only when the harm he in fact caused
was, at the time he acted, foreseeable to him . . . .”).
3. Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 323
(2002).
4. Id. at 328.
5. See id. (describing that in the limited set of cases where “scientists
would not have predicted this relationship ex ante,” no liability exists).
6. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 518 (C.A. 1963).
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sodium cyanide.7 A chemical reaction between the liquid and
the sindanyo cover caused an eruption that resulted in burn
injuries to the plaintiffs.8 The fact that sindanyo could undergo
this reaction at was unknown to scientists at the time.9 The
type of harm suffered by the plaintiff (burning due to splashing
of hot liquid) was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
reckless handling of the liquid, yet the defendant escaped
liability.10 The systematic relationship between the defendant’s
misconduct and the plaintiff’s harm (splashing due to an
obscure chemical reaction) was not only unknown to the
defendant but also materially different from what was known
and foreseeable (splashing due to mechanical action).11
The foreseeability issue is often resolved without
controversy in cases where the science is established. 12 For
example, the link between mesothelioma and protracted
exposure to asbestos fibers is generally accepted. 13 Medical
opinion is near unanimous that lung cancer is a foreseeable
consequence of tobacco smoke, based on clinical evidence that
carcinogens in tobacco smoke interact with human DNA to
cause genetic mutations that result in lung cancer.14 Novel and
complex scientific phenomena present greater difficulties,
notably in the field of medicine. 15 The Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the mechanisms by which it
causes the degenerative disease known as Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) have presented
7. Id. at 519.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 518 (“In the present case the potential eruptive qualities . . .
were not suspected and they were not a known source of danger . . . .”).
10. Id.
11. Id. (“[I]t would be quite unrealistic to describe this accident as a
variant of the perils from splashing.”).
12. See Grady, supra note 3, at 329 (comparing Doughty v. Turner
Manufacturing Co. to a case where the science was more understood).
13. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1105
(1973) (explaining that the scope of an asbestos manufacturer’s duty to warn
includes foreseeable dangers related to exposure to asbestosis, mesothelioma,
and other cancers); Jenny Steele & Nick Wikeley, Dust on the Streets and
Liability for Environmental Cancers, 60 MOD. L. REV. 265, 268 (1997).
14. Stephen S. Hecht, Tobacco Smoke Carcinogens and Lung Cancer, 91
J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1194, 1194 (1991).
15. See Ross D. Eckert, The AIDS Blood-Transfusion Cases: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Liability, 29 SANDIEGO L. REV. 203, 204 (1992).
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challenges, not only to medical researchers striving for a cure
or at least better understanding,16 but also to lawyers litigating
issues related to the syndrome.17 In particular, HIV-related
diseases caused by negligently ordered or administered blood
transfusions have triggered an avalanche of lawsuits.18
Common AIDS-defining opportunistic infections and
diseases were known blood-borne risks even before the AIDS
epidemic. 19 This fact appears to suggest that AIDS was a
foreseeable blood-borne risk before and during the early stages
of the epidemic. The general common law rule is that the type
of injury must be foreseeable, rather than its extent or manner
of occurrence. 20 Defendants who negligently ordered or
administered blood transfusions that resulted in AIDS
nevertheless escaped liability during the early stages of the
epidemic.21 The analysis in this Article supports these verdicts.
16. See id. (describing AIDS as “the public health crisis of our time”).
17. See Beth Rabkin & Michael Scott Rabkin, Individual and
Institutional Liability for Transfusion-Acquired Diseases: An Update, 256
JAMA 2242, 2242 (1986); David Stevens, Negligence Liability for Transfusion-
Associated AIDS Transmission, 12 J. LEGALMED. 221 (1991); see also Osborn
v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 104 (1992).
18. Eckert, supra note 15, at 204; Donald H.J. Hermann, AIDS:
Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1987);
Michael Trebilcock et al., Do Institutions Matter? A Comparative Pathology of
the HIV-Infected Blood Tragedy, 82 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1407–09, 1483–84
(1996).
19. See Alexandra M. Levine, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The
Facts, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 423, 424 (1991) (“AIDS is diagnosed when an
individual is found to have one or more of the following illnesses: (1)
opportunistic infection (2) Kaposi’s sarcoma (3) high-grade, B-cell lymphoma
(4) AIDS-dementia/encephalopathy syndrome (5) wasting syndrome (slim
disease).”). These common AIDS-defining opportunistic infections and diseases
such as cytomegalovirus infection, lymphomas including non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma, human T-lymphotropic virus infection, and toxoplasmosis were
known and foreseeable blood-borne risks before the AIDS epidemic. Yao-
Chang Chen et al., Infection of Human T-cell Leukemia Virus Type I and
Development of Human T-cell Leukemia/Lymphoma in Patients with
Hematologic Neoplasms: A Possible Linkage to Blood Transfusion, 74 BLOOD
388 (1989); S. Gerald Sandier & F. Carl Grumet, Posttransfusion
Cytomegalovirus Infections, 69 PEDIATRICS 650, 650 (1982)
(“[C]ytomegalovirus has been recognized as a potential hazard of blood
transfusion since 1966 . . . .”).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1990);
Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in
relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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The type of harm, AIDS-defining opportunistic infections, was
indeed foreseeable but scientists could not predict the
systematic relationship between blood transfusions and AIDS.
In addition, HIV/AIDS was not a mere variant of known blood-
borne risks.22
Analysis of the foreseeability of HIV/AIDS as blood-borne
risk requires a translation of the foreseeability doctrine into
the language of medicine that preserves the common law
meaning of the doctrine.23 The essence of the doctrine is the
concept of a systematic relationship between a defendant’s
wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s harm. 24 The systematic
relationship between a tort such as medical malpractice and a
disease is defined by the etiology and pathogenesis of the
disease.25 The etiology of a disease is the cause or set of causes
of the disease.26 The pathogenesis is the mechanism by which
an etiologic agent produces the disease. 27 For instance, the
etiology of lung cancer includes carcinogens such as tobacco
smoke.28 The pathogenesis of lung cancer includes mechanisms
such as the interaction of carcinogens with human DNA to
22. SeeMark Woolhouse et al., Human Viruses: Discovery and Emergence,
367 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y 2864, 2864, 2867–68 (2012); see also Mark F.
Grady, Causation and Foreseeability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORTS 114 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (“The basic
purpose of reasonable-foresight proximate cause is to cut off liability
for . . . accidents that are not mere variants of those that were ex ante
foreseeable.”).
23. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 165
(1999) (“When dealing with [new technologies], judges are to be translators;
different technologies are the different languages; and the aim is to find a
reading of [legal principles] that preserves [their] meaning from one world’s
technology to another. This is fidelity as translation.”).
24. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1271 (2009) (“[T]he plaintiff’s injury
must correlate with that aspect of the defendant’s conduct that was
negligent.”).
25. See generally A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 132 (John M. Last ed.,
4th ed. 2001); RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED
MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 268 (1987).
26. SLOANE, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 535 (defining pathogenesis as “the cellular events and reactions
and other pathologic mechanisms occurring in the development of disease.”);
Bernard N. Fields, Pathogenesis of Viral Infections, in EMERGING VIRUSES 70
(Stephen S. Morse ed., 1996) (“Pathogenesis is the interaction of a microbe
with a host resulting in an outcome by which a disease occurs.”).
28. Hecht, supra note 14, at 1194.
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cause genetic mutations that result in lung cancer. 29 Lung
cancer is a foreseeable consequence of human exposure to
tobacco smoke because medical evidence shows that tobacco
smoke contains an etiologic agent that initiates the
pathogenesis of lung cancer in the exposed person.30
HIV is the etiologic agent of the mechanisms that
culminate in AIDS-defining diseases and infections. 31 The
foreseeability of AIDS as a blood-borne risk therefore depends
on (1) awareness in the medical profession of HIV and its
essential features, and (2) whether HIV is a mere variant of
known disease-causing viruses and their pathogenesis.32
In the early stages of the AIDS epidemic, medical science
was ignorant of the systematic relationship between AIDS and
blood transfusions.33 The etiologic agent of AIDS, HIV, was
first identified and isolated only in 1983, and medical research
confirmed the pathogenetic relationship between HIV and
AIDS in 1984.34
The systematic relationship is not a mere variant of what
is known and foreseeable because the etiology and pathogenesis
of AIDS both differ materially from those of other viral
diseases. 35 The etiologic agent (HIV) has a complex genetic
structure and novel molecular mechanisms controlling its viral
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Eckert, supra note 15, at 204, 226; see also infra note 370 and
accompanying text.
32. See Eckert, supra note 15, at 246–60 (discussing requirements to
establish causation in “blood cases”); see also Grady, supra note 22, at 114
(“The basic purpose of reasonable-foresight proximate cause is to cut off
liability for . . . accidents that are not mere variants of those that were ex ante
foreseeable.”).
33. See Janice E. Clements & M. Christine Zink, Molecular Biology and
Pathogenesis of Animal Lentivirus Infections, 9 CLINICALMICROBIOLOGY REV.
100, 101 (1996); Kent A. Sepkowitz, AIDS—The First 20 Years, 344 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1764, 1764–65 (2001) (discussing the many early theories for the
cause of AIDS, and that there was “doubt about a viral cause . . . until the
actual virus was detected”).
34. Sepkowitz, supra note 33, at 1765 (outlining the major timeline of
events in first decade of the AIDS epidemic); see also infra note 370 and
accompanying text.
35. Sepkowitz, supra note 33, at 1765 (discussing how early hypotheses
that AIDS was caused by cytomegalovirus was not upheld after observing
pathogenesis in patients with the disease, and that over time “a novel viral
cause of the disease” became a favored theory).
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gene expression that distinguish it from other human viruses.36
The pathogenesis of AIDS is distinctive as well, as discussed
below.37
The distinctive features of HIV are material because they
confer on HIV unique abilities that play a central role in the
distinctive pathogenesis of AIDS.38 Three prominent features of
HIV are (1) extreme genetic variability, (2) a capacity to infect
nondividing cells, and (3) unique genetic and molecular
structure.
36. For instance, in addition to the gag, pol and env genes common to all
retroviruses, the HIV genome contains six additional genes, namely tat, rev,
vif, vpr, nef, and vpu. Daniel A. Eckstein et al., HIV-1 Vpr Enhances Viral
Burden by Facilitating Infection of Tissue Macrophages but Not Nondividing
CD4+ T Cells, 194 J. EXPERIMENTAL MED. 1407, 1407 (2001) (“In addition to
the gag, pol and env genes found in all retroviruses, the HIV-1 genome
contains six additional genes: tat, rev, vif, vpr, vpu, and nef. These genes
confer upon HIV-1 a number of unique abilities, including the capacity to
infect non-cycling cells.”); Anthony S. Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency
Virus: Infectivity and Mechanisms of Pathogenesis, 239 SCIENCE 617, 617
(1988) (“HIV also has at least five additional genes, three of which have
known regulatory functions, and the expression of these genes almost
certainly has an impact on the pathogenic mechanisms exerted by the virus.”).
37. See Part V.C.3. Professors Narayan and Clements describe features
that distinguish the pathogenesis of HIV from those of other disease-causing
viruses, calling HIV “the antithesis of [the] general concept of pathogenesis of
viral disease.” Opendra Narayan & Janice E. Clements, Biology and
Pathogenesis of Lentiviruses, 70 J. GEN. VIROLOGY 1617, 1618 (1989); see also
C. Harold Mielke, Jr., The Uniqueness of HIV Infection, 8 J. CLINICAL
APHERESIS 2, 4 (1993) (“HIV is indeed a unique infection; it is able to directly
infect specific cells of the human immune system to produce immune
abnormalities that lead to the development of opportunistic infections, host
compromise, morbidity, and mortality. The retrovirus is able to directly infect
cells of the immune system, especially the cells that contain the CD4 surface
receptors. The virus contains reverse transcriptase, which is able to reverse
the flow of genetic information by converting RNA into proviral DNA that is
incorporated into the host cell’s DNA.”); Xiping Wei et al., Antibody
Neutralization and Escape by HIV-1, 422 NATURE 307 (2003) (describing a
strategy by HIV-1 to avoid attack by antibodies, not seen in other viruses); see
also Margaret I. Johnston & Anthony S. Fauci, An HIV Vaccine—Challenges
and Prospects, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 888 (2008) (describing the unique
pathogenesis of HIV).
38. Martin A. Nowak & Andrew J. McMichael, How HIV Defeats the
Immune System, SCI. AM., Aug. 1995, at 58, 60–62 (describing the unique
process of HIV infection and disease progression).
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A. GENETIC VARIABILITY
Three unique properties combine to make HIV the most
variable human virus: a high mutation rate, a high replication
frequency, and a high recombination frequency.39
1. HIV has a high mutation rate.40 The genetic information
of HIV is encoded in RNA rather than DNA, but it inserts a
DNA copy of its genome into a host cell in order to replicate.41
This process requires the action of the enzyme reverse
transcriptase, which copies the viral RNA genome into a DNA
sequence. 42 The virus mutates during this process because
reverse transcriptase is error prone and has no editing
mechanism for transcriptional errors. 43 HIV reverse
transcriptase is one of the most error prone reverse
transcriptase enzymes known.44
2. HIV has an exceptionally high replication frequency, 45
which contributes to AIDS pathogenesis in at least two ways.
The sheer volume of viral replication inside the host immune
cell overwhelms and kills the cell by monopolizing the cell’s
resources and disrupting the cell membrane. 46 Rapid viral
39. Charles R.M. Bangham & Rodney E. Phillips, What Is Required of an
HIV Vaccine?, 350 LANCET 1615, 1615 (1997) (attributing difficulty of
treatment and prevention of HIV infection to the “high rates of replication,
mutation, and recombination of HIV”).
40. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 59–60 (“The virus mutates
readily . . . because reverse transcriptase is rather error prone.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (“It has been estimated that each time the enzyme copies RNA into
DNA, the new DNA on average differs from that of the previous generation in
one site.”); John D. Roberts et al., The Accuracy of Reverse Transcriptase from
HIV-1, 242 SCIENCE 1171, 1171 (1988) (“[T]he HIV-1 enzyme does not correct
errors by exonucleolytic proofreading.”).
44. Lori H. Conlan et al., Localization, Mobility and Fidelity of
Retrotransposed Group II Introns in rRNA Genes, 33 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES.
5262, 5268 (2005) (“HIV-1 RT [reverse transcriptase] is the most error-prone
RT known.”); Susan M. Schader & Mark A. Wainberg, Insights into HIV-1
Pathogenesis Through Drug Discovery: 30 Years of Basic Research and
Concerns for the Future, 10 HIV & AIDS REV. 91, 91 (2011) (“HIV-1 reverse
transcriptase was observed to be remarkably error-prone relative to other
retrovirus reverse transcription enzymes . . . .”).
45. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 60.
46. Id. at 58 (“In the initial stage of HIV infection, the virus
colonizes . . . cells and macrophages. It also replicates unchecked for a while.
As the amount of virus soars, the number of helper cells falls; macrophages die
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replication also combines with and amplifies the high mutation
rate to make HIV the most variable human virus known.47
3. HIV is the most recombinogenic known human virus.48
Recombination is a process that enhances genetic variability of
HIV within an infected individual during RNA to DNA
transcription by scrambling the genetic content from two
nonidentical RNA copies to generate a hybrid DNA mosaic.49
The resulting genetic variability of HIV contributes to
AIDS pathogenesis by allowing the virus to escape recognition
by the immune response and evade the effects of anti-retroviral
therapies and vaccines.50
B. CAPACITY TO INFECTNONDIVIDING CELLS
The second distinctive feature of HIV, the ability to infect
nondividing cells such as macrophages51 is, like its extreme
mutability, central to AIDS pathogenesis.52 Macrophages serve
as well . . . . The infected []cells perish as thousands of new viral particles
erupt from the cell membrane.”).
47. Id. at 60.
48. Etienne Simon-Loriere et al., RNA Structures, Genomic Organization
and Selection of Recombinant HIV, 8 RNA BIOLOGY 280, 280 (2011) (“[I]n
retroviruses and notably in the case of HIV, recombination is so frequent that
it can be considered as part of its mode of replication.”).
49. Id. RNA carries two copies of RNA in each particle, both of which are
used as a template to insert DNA into the host. Id. If the two RNA copies are
not perfectly identical, a “scrambling” or recombination of the RNA templates
creates a “new” DNA sequence. See id.; see also Wenfeng An & Alice
Telesnitsky, HIV-1 Genetic Recombination: Experimental Approaches and
Observations, 4 AIDS REV. 195, 196 (2002) (“[R]etroviruses differ from other
viruses in that each contains duplicate RNAs. Retroviruses are sometimes
considered to be diploid . . . . Co-packaging two RNAs in a single virion
provides two templates to the reverse transcriptase machinery and is a critical
factor in the high frequency of retroviral recombination.”).
50. Id. (“This process . . . [is] involved in immune escape and development
of resistance to antiviral treatments.”).
51. Macrophages are white blood cells within tissues that play an
important role in the human immune response; their role is to phagocytize
(engulf and then digest) cellular debris and pathogens, and to stimulate
lymphocytes and other immune cells to respond to the pathogen. See GABRIEL
VIRELLA, MEDICAL IMMUNOLOGY 2 (5th ed. 2001); PAUL A. VOLBERDING ET
AL., GLOBAL HIV/AIDS MEDICINE 40 (2008); Stephanie Forrest et al.,
Computer Immunology, 40 COMM. ACM 88, 90 (1997).
52. Most retroviruses can enter the nucleus of a cell only while the cell is
dividing. Masahiro Yamashita et al., Evidence for Direct Involvement of the
Caspid Protein HIV Infection of Nondividing Cells, 3 PLOS PATHOGENS 1502,
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as viral targets and reservoirs, facilitate pathogenesis of AIDS-
related neurological disorders, and contribute to the
development of AIDS-defining opportunistic infections.53
C. UNIQUEHIV GENETIC STRUCTURE ANDMOLECULAR
MECHANISMS
The unique and powerful pathogenesis of HIV is directly
attributable to distinctive aspects of its genetic structure. For
instance, the six genes that are unique to HIV—which
distinguish it from other retroviruses—play a central role in its
high mutation rate and ability to infect and replicate in
macrophages.54 The tat and nef genes amplify and maintain the
replication rate of HIV, a key contributor to genetic diversity.55
1502 (2007) (“[M]ost retroviruses, such as murine leukemia virus, require cell
division for efficient infection.”). HIV, in contrast, possesses genetic features
that enable it to infect and replicate efficiently in non-dividing cells, including
immune cells known as macrophages. Id. (“One of the properties that set HIV-
1 . . . apart from most of the other retroviruses is the ability to infect cells
independent of the cell cycle. This ability allows HIV-1 to propagate in
nondividing cells . . . .”) (citation omitted).
53. See Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1619–22, 1630 (“Since
macrophages constitute the main non-specific cellular defence system of the
host, lentivirus [HIV] replication undoubtedly subverts this arm of the defence
system and results in failure of the host to eliminate the virus.”); infra note
418.
54. See Clements & Zink, supra note 33, at 102 (“The additional gene
products of the [HIV] lentiviruses contribute to a more complex pattern of
gene expression and may also contribute to the pathogenesis of disease.”); Jay
A. Levy, Pathogenesis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 57
MICROBIOLOGICAL REV. 183, 188 (1993).
55. Bangham & Phillips, supra note 39, at 1616–17 (“The kinetics of HIV-
1 replication are complicated by the regulatory genes tat, nef, vpu, vpr, and
vif . . . . The Nef protein is particularly important in maintaining the high
replication rate of HIV-1—and therefore its pathogenicity—in vivo. Also, the
virus weakens the immune defenses by steadily depleting the CD4+ T-cell
population . . . .”); Fauci, supra note 36, at 617; John L. Foster & J. Victor
Garcia, Role of Nef in HIV-1 Replication and Pathogenesis, 55 ADV.
PHARMACOLOGY 389, 389–90 (2007) (“Nef is a pathogenic factor of HIV . . . .
The enhancement of viral replication and pathogenesis by Nef [may be
explained by] . . . the ability of Nef to enhance viral particle infectivity.”); see
Paul U. Cameron & Mark Kelly, HIV Immunopathology, in HIV
MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALASIA: A GUIDE FOR CLINICAL CARE 19, 26 (Jennifer
Hoy et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.som.uq.edu.au/media/418950
/hiv_aus_guide.pdf (discussing how “a number of HIV proteins interfere with
critical cellular processes that facilitate the host immune response,” including
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The rev gene has been described as “absolutely essential” for
viral replication,56 in addition to its other contributions to HIV
functionality and pathogenicity.57 The vpr gene confers upon
HIV the capacity to infect and replicate efficiently in
nondividing cells such as macrophages.58 The vif59 and vpu60
genes also play important roles in the pathogenesis of HIV.
In summary, the risk of HIV/AIDS was unforeseeable in
the early stages of the AIDS epidemic. The etiology and
pathogenesis of HIV/AIDS were discovered only in 1983 and
the Nef protein); Eric O. Freed, HIV-1 Replication, 26 SOMATIC CELL &
MOLECULARGENETICS 13, 29 (2001).
56. Thomas J. Hope & Didier Trono, Structure, Expression, and
Regulation of the HIV Genome, HIV INSITE (Nov. 2000),
http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-00&doc=kb-02-01-02 (“Rev is
absolutely required for HIV-1 replication: proviruses that lack Rev function
are transcriptionally active but do not produce viral late genes and thus do not
produce virions.”).
57. Clements & Zink, supra note 33, at 100 (“The regulatory genes tat and
rev control viral transcription and RNA transport and translation . . . .”);
Freed, supra note 55, at 13 (“Rev plays a major role in the transport of viral
RNAs from the nucleus to the cytoplasm.”); Miranda Shehu-Xhilaga & Robert
Oelrichs, Basic HIV Virology, in HIV MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALASIA: A GUIDE
FOR CLINICAL CARE, supra note 55, at 9, 10 (“[T]he Rev responsive
element . . . assists export of spliced RNA transcripts from the nucleus of the
cell.”).
58. Eckstein et al., supra note 36, at 1407 (“Viral protein R (Vpr) in
particular is known to play an important role in facilitating infection of non-
dividing tissue macrophages as well as inducing G2 cell cycle arrest in dividing
T cells.”); Louis M. Mansky, The Mutation Rate of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type 1 Is Influenced by the vpr Gene, 222 VIROLOGY 391, 394 (1996);
Hengli Tang et al., Lentivirus Replication and Regulation, 33 ANNUAL REV.
GENETICS 133, 154 (1999) (“HIV-1 vpr also has a role in the nuclear import of
HIV-1 preintegration complexes (PICs) into the nucleus of infected cells. This
makes vpr an important player in HIV infection of nondividing cells, such as
macrophages.”).
59. Koji Sakai et al., Recombinational Analysis of a Natural
Noncytopathic Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) Isolate: Role of
the vif Gene in HIV-1 Infection Kinetics and Cytopathy, 65 J. VIROLOGY 5765,
5770 (1991); Shehu-Xhilaga & Oelrichs, supra note 57, at 11 (“Viral proteins
perform a variety of roles to subvert normal cellular function and facilitate
viral replication . . . . Vif is necessary for subsequent efficient infectivity of the
newly produced viral particles.”).
60. John W. Balliet et al., Distinct Effects in Primary Macrophages and
Lymphocytes of The Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Accessory Genes,
vpr, vpu, and nef: Mutational Analysis of a Primary HIV-1 Isolate, 200
VIROLOGY 623 (1995); Freed, supra note 55, at 28; Shehu-Xhilaga & Oelrichs,
supra note 57 (“Vpu promotes degradation of CD4 in the endoplasmic
reticulum . . . .”).
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1984, respectively. 61 Furthermore, the risk was not a mere
variant of what was known and foreseeable. HIV has a complex
genetic structure and novel molecular mechanisms controlling
its viral gene expression that distinguish it from other human
viruses. These distinctive features are material because they
confer on HIV unique abilities that play a central role in the
distinctive pathogenesis of AIDS, a pathogenesis that the
human immune response can neither contain nor defeat.
The analysis in this Article supports the common law
evolution of the foreseeability issue in HIV/AIDS blood
transfusion cases. Courts in early cases such as Quinones v.
Long Island College Hospital62 and Fox v. Estrada63 held that
HIV/AIDS is not a foreseeable blood-borne risk. Eventually,
after scientists had isolated the virus and discovered the
pathogenesis of AIDS, courts began to resolve the foreseeability
issue in favor of plaintiffs.64
The Article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the
foreseeability doctrine and its conceptual and doctrinal roles in
negligence law. Part III discusses the legal definition of
foreseeability. Part IV introduces the Reasonable Ignorance of
the Relationship doctrine and analyzes its common law
foundations. Part V presents an analysis of the foreseeability of
HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk.
61. Sepkowitz, supra note 33.
62. Quinones v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 607 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
63. Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *2 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998) (“[T]he contraction of AIDS was not a foreseeable proximate
result of a blood transfusion known within the medical community in
1982 . . . .”).
64. See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
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II. THE FORESEEABILITY DOCTRINE
Foreseeability is a pervasive and vital ingredient of the law
of torts.65 Professor David Owen describes foreseeability as “the
dark matter of tort” that permeates and connects its various
components, and that “gives moral content to the law of
negligence, controlling how each element fits together and,
ultimately, whether one person is bound to pay another for
harm.”66
Foreseeability plays several conceptual roles in the law of
negligence. The degree to which a defendant could foresee the
consequences of a wrongful act is a factor in assigning
blameworthiness and moral responsibility for any harmful
consequences.67 Furthermore, limiting a defendant’s liability to
reasonably foreseeable harm promotes deterrence and economic
efficiency.68 Foreseeability places reasonable boundaries on the
scope of a defendant’s liability by limiting liability to
65. See Owen, supra note 1.
66. Id. at 1277.
67. Id. at 1280 (“For a person’s actions to be wrongful, the person must
have had a choice of alternative courses of action and also must have chosen,
by some standard, incorrectly. If an actor chooses to act in a manner that
violates some community norm, of proper behavior, tort law holds the actor
accountable for harmful consequences that result from that choice. Thus, tort
responsibility normally implies that the actor ought to have considered and
chosen to avoid the kind of harm he caused—that he or she wrongfully failed
to avoid the harm. So, ascribing moral character (blame or praise) to a choice
to risk or avoid the risk of harm implies the actor’s ability to conceive (foresee)
its consequences. Foreseeability thus is bound up, inextricably, in notions of
both wrongfulness and how far responsibility for wrongfulness should
extend.”); see W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 921, 943 (2005) (“[O]utcome-responsibility depends on the notion of
control. Only an agent who is in control of his or her actions, and to a certain
degree, of the consequences of those actions, may be said to be outcome-
responsible. [T]he necessary degree of control over the outcome is defined by
whether the outcome was avoidable, and avoidability exists only in the
presence of a general capacity to foresee an outcome and to take steps to avoid
its occurrence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See Cardi, supra note 67, at 955 (“Only an injury that is foreseeable is
capable of being deterred.”); see also WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 247 (1987) (“[A dog owner]
is liable only if he has reason to suspect the dog’s vicious disposition . . . . Even
if the probability of the dog’s biting is very high, the owner will not be liable
unless he has reason to know it is high.”).
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consequences reasonably related to the alleged wrongdoing;69
and courts frequently employ foreseeability as an instrument to
achieve policy goals, such as obtaining an appropriate balance
between conflicting interests of the parties to a dispute.70
In addition to its conceptual role, foreseeability plays an
important doctrinal role in negligence law. The general rule is
that a defendant is liable only when the harm she in fact
caused was foreseeable at the time of wrongdoing. 71
Foreseeability plays specific roles in several elements of
negligence.72 The plaintiff in a negligence action has to prove
the following elements:73
69. See MIRKO BAGARIC ET AL., TORTS: COMPENSATION FOR HARM 233
(2011) (“[T]he defendant will not be liable if the harm caused is too remote.
Harm will be too remote where it was not reasonably foreseeable as a result of
the act of the defendant.”); Cardi, supra note 67, at 927
(“[F]oreseeability . . . aids in the decision of whether the actual consequences
of the defendant’s conduct were so . . . far-removed from the risks that made
the conduct negligent that the defendant, though blameworthy, should not be
held liable for them.”); Owen, supra note 1, at 1278 (“[B]ecause the effects of
all behavior extend forever, no coherent conception of responsibility can
suppose that a person is responsible for everything that could be called a
consequence of his or her actions . . . . [A] defendant is responsible for and only
for such harm as he could reasonably have seen and prevented.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70. Cardi, supra note 67, at 983 (“To the extent that a court imposes
atypical boundaries on a jury’s determination of foreseeability in order to
effect a policy-based limitation on liability, such a determination lies squarely
within the province of the court to delineate the standard of care or to define
the legal standard for proximate cause.”). Cardi refers to the use of
foreseeability “as a proxy for decisions of policy.” Id. at 938. In cases involving
liability of a business owner for assault of a customer on its premises, “many
courts have imposed a duty, limited . . . by foreseeability. In some
jurisdictions, for example, a business owner owes a duty to protect patrons
only if he is aware of specific, imminent harm about to befall them . . . . [But
all] test[s] represent a balance between the security interest of customers and
the liberty interest of owners.” Id. at 984.
71. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 2; Grady, supra note 22 (“U.S. courts
have held that a defendant will be immune from liability for an accident
otherwise caused by negligence if it was not ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”).
72. See Cardi, supra note 67, at 921 (“The concept of foreseeability is fast
devouring the negligence cause of action.”).
73. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS § 114, 269 (2001) (stating
that the prima facie case for negligence consists of the following elements:
duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause, and actual damage); David G.
Owen, Idea: The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1671–
72 (2007); Owen, supra note 1.
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1. A duty of care to prevent unreasonable risks of harm.
2. A breach of duty.
3. A causal connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff’s harm.74
4. Actual damage resulting from the defendant’s
negligence.
Foreseeability features in three elements. Foreseeability
defines whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff,75
whether the defendant breached a duty, 76 and whether the
defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.77
Negligence liability of a defendant depends first and
foremost on the existence of a duty of care to the plaintiff,78
defined as a legally mandated obligation to take reasonable
care to avoid a risk of harm to another.79 A duty of care may be
74. This element includes actual, as well as proximate, cause. A
defendant’s negligence is the actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm if but for the
breach the harm would not have occurred. Owen, supra note 73, at 1680. The
proximate causation element requires the defendant’s conduct to be
reasonably related to the plaintiff’s harm. Id. at 1681 (defining proximate
cause as “a reasonably close connection between a defendant’s wrong and the
plaintiff’s injury, a connection that is not remote”).
75. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty
and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 739, 758 (2005) (“[P]laintiff-foreseeability frequently makes a dual
appearance, influencing both duty and proximate cause analyses.”); Cardi,
supra note 67, at 923 (“[F]oreseeability remains a pervasive consideration in
many courts’ duty analyses.”).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (Discussion Draft 1999)
(“Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable
care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable
severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be borne by
the actor and others if the actor takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the
possibility of harm.”); Cardi, supra note 67, at 921 (“Foreseeability of risk has
for centuries rested at the heart of courts’ determinations of whether a
defendant breached its duty of care.”).
77. See, e.g., WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 281 (5th ed. 1984); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
78. Owen, supra note 1, at 1301 (“Every negligence claim must pass
through the duty portal that bounds the scope of tort recovery for accidental
harm.”).
79. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12–15
(1953).
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imposed by common law tort principles.80 A duty may also be
imposed by statute, either expressly81 or by legal precedent, if
the statute does not expressly provide for civil liability.82
Foreseeability is a fundamental consideration in the duty
analysis,83 and has been described as duty’s “unified theory.”84
It is a necessary, and perhaps the most important, factor in
determining whether a duty exists. 85 Courts have denied a
duty based on absence of foreseeability, even where the
defendant’s conduct created a risk of physical harm. 86
80. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koening, Extending Learned
Hand’s Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 237, 239–40 (2007) (“[C]ompanies have a duty to provide
reasonable information security practices under the common law of torts.”);
Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 272–82 (2005) (discussing various examples of
common law derived duties).
81. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 2005) (“A business that owns
or licenses personal information about a California resident shall implement
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information, to protect the personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”).
82. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 (Discussion Draft 1999)
(“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is
designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and
if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to
protect.”); VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT
LAW 305–06 (3d ed. 2005).
83. See, e.g., J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 928 (N.J. 1998) (“Foreseeability
of the risk of harm is the foundational element in the determination of
whether a duty exists.”); Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1258 (“[F]oreseeability
[is] a significant factor (and frequently the most significant factor) in
analyzing whether the duty element is met in a negligence claim.”). But see
Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 (Ariz. 2007) (“[W]e now expressly hold that
foreseeability is not a factor to be considered by courts when making
determinations of duty, and we reject any contrary suggestion in prior
opinions.”).
84. Cardi, supra note 67, at 922; see also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting
Tarasoff, 58 ALA. L. REV. 97, 121–23 (1994).
85. See HAROLD LUNTZ ET AL., TORTS CASES AND COMMENTARY 129 (6th
ed. 2009); Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 361, 374 (2004) (“Other factors may be relevant to the
existence of a duty, but foreseeability provides an outer bound beyond which
there can be no liability because there can be no duty.”).
86. E.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 187 (N.M. 2003) (stating
that there is no duty unless the plaintiff was within the scope of risk created
by the defendant); see also Cardi, supra note 67, at 930 (“[F]oreseeability has
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Foreseeability is sufficient to create a duty when a defendant
has committed an affirmative act that created a risk of harm to
others.87 In this limited set of cases, the defendant owes a duty
of care to all plaintiffs foreseeably within the scope of the risk.88
Foreseeability by itself is not sufficient in all circumstances to
trigger a duty. The California Supreme Court89 as well as the
courts of most other states,90 list foreseeability prominently
among the factors to be balanced in determining whether a
duty exists, but make it clear that other factors also play a
role.91
“Breach of duty” refers to a violation of the duty to avoid
unreasonable risks of harm to others. 92 Common law rules
require the plaintiff to prove breach of duty by identifying and
pleading an untaken precaution that would have prevented the
accident, had it been taken.93 The defendant will be in breach if
the benefits of risk reduction provided by the pleaded
precaution exceed its cost.94 The plaintiff must further show
become so central a concept in may courts’ duty analyses that a ruling on
foreseeability is outcome-determinative.”).
87. See, e.g., Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 723 (Or. 1979)
(concluding that “the agent’s duty should be defined in terms of
foreseeability,” and that “the agent was required to perform this duty so as to
avoid creating a foreseeable risk of harm to others”).
88. See, e.g., id.; Jill M. Fraley, Comment: Knowledge Circles and the Duty
of Care, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2010) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010)).
89. E.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]he
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”).
90. See Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent
Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the
New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1524 (1997) (concluding from a survey of duty in fifty
states that foreseeability has become prominent in determining the existence
of a duty of care); Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1258.
91. See Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.
92. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 115, at 270.
93. See id.
94. Delisi v. St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 701 S.W.2d
170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the plaintiff had to prove physician’s
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that the precaution is technically feasible; namely, that there
were reasonable practical means by which it could have been
implemented.95
Foreseeability plays a crucial role in breach analysis.96 The
breach calculus weighs the cost of the untaken precaution
against the value of the reduction in all foreseeable risks that
the precaution would have provided, not just the risk that
actually materialized.97
Foreseeability is the touchstone of the element of
proximate cause.98 Professor Michael S. Moore formulates the
breach of duty by specifying the treatment that should have been
administered); Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139,
143 (1989) (“[Courts] take the plaintiff’s allegations of the untaken
precautions of the defendant and ask, in light of the precautions that had been
taken, whether some particular precaution promised benefits (in accident
reduction) greater than its associated costs.”). For a numerical example of
breach analysis, see Meiring de Villiers, Information Security Standards and
Liability, 13 J. INTERNET L. 24, 28–29 (2010).
95. See, e.g., Martin v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 745, 754
(E.D. Tenn. 2000) (defining feasibility in terms of technological and scientific
realities of the time); see also David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV.
291, 331 (2008).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“A person acts negligently if the person
does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors
to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care
are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm,
the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 59–60 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the
role of foreseeability in breach); MARC A. FRANKLIN& ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 399 (7th ed. 2001); Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1249–
50.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICALHARM § 3 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[A]ll the risks foreseeably resulting from
the actor’s conduct are considered in ascertaining whether the actor has
exercised reasonable care.”); Cardi, supra note 75, at 746 (“The brand of
foreseeability associated with breach is one of general focus. That is, it does
not examine the foreseeability of the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff,
but the foreseeable likelihood and severity of injuries that might have
occurred.”); Grady, supra note 94, at 146; Owen, supra note 1, at 1292.
98. Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Conn. 1983) (“The test for
finding proximate cause ‘is whether the harm which occurred was of the same
general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s
negligence.’”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM
(BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 29, cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 23, 2002); K. BARKER ET
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 565 (5th ed. 2012) (“The basic test of
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basic rule succinctly: “[t]he dominant test of proximate cause in
torts makes a defendant liable when but only when the harm
he in fact caused was, at the time he acted, foreseeable to
him.” 99 Commenting on the role of foreseeability, Professor
Jonathan Cardi states: “[A] plaintiff may fail to survive the
proximate cause inquiry where the defendant’s actions resulted
in 1) an unforeseeable type of injury, 2) an injury occurring in
an unforeseeable manner, or 3) injury to an unforeseeable
plaintiff.”100
III. LEGAL DEFINITION OF FORESEEABILITY
Despite, or perhaps due to, its prominence in the law of
negligence, commentators have described the concept of
foreseeability as elusive and confounding, 101 frequently
manipulated and co-opted by the judiciary,102 and undermining
the perceived legitimacy of the judicial process. 103 These
remoteness of damage . . . is foreseeability.”); DOBBS, supra note 73, § 187, at
463 (“[C]ourts usually reduce the tests of proximate cause . . . to a question of
foreseeability.”); FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 96, at 399; B. RICHARDS ET
AL., TORT LAW IN PRINCIPLE 305 (5th ed. 2009) (“In the issue of remoteness,
the court is not judging whether the defendant has been negligent (that has
already been established); it is merely deciding what are the foreseeable
consequences of that negligence.”); Grady, supra note 3, at 322–32 (discussing
the reasonable foresight paradigms of proximate cause); Owen, supra note 1,
at 1293 (“[T]he concept of ‘foreseeability’ . . . is the ‘touchstone’ or ‘cornerstone’
of proximate cause.”).
99. MOORE, supra note 2; see also BAGARIC ET AL., supra note 69, at 233
(“[T]he defendant will not be liable if the harm caused is too remote. Harm
will be too remote where it was not reasonably foreseeable as a result of the
act of the defendant.”); DOBBS, supra note 73, § 180, at 443; Owen, supra note
1, at 1294 (“[P]roximate cause limits negligence responsibility to the scope of
risks that are foreseeable.”).
100. Cardi, supra note 75, at 749.
101. Id. at 744 (“[T]he term [foreseeability] is surely among the most
confounding in the common law.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of
Foreseeability, 10 KAN. L.L. & PUB. POL’Y 156, 156 (2000) (“Foreseeability is
undoubtedly a muddle in the law of negligence.”).
102. See Cardi, supra note 75, at 740–43 (“[Foreseeability has] been bent,
muddled, and co-opted to such a degree that it has lost any real meaning.”); id.
at 743 (“In many courts, the foreseeability lens seems to expand, contract or
change focus at the will of the judge. Indeed . . . some have argued that the
doctrine of foreseeability has lost any fixed meaning and instead acts as a
mere surrogate for judicial discretion.” ).
103. Id. at 741 (“[T]o the extent that reference to foreseeability masks the
actual reasons for a judge’s decision to impose or deny negligence liability,
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concerns notwithstanding, a clear and precise definition of
foreseeability can be distilled from the noise of common law
patterns. An event is the foreseeable result of an action if the
action ex ante created or enhanced the risk of the event.104 An
equivalent definition describes foreseeability as a systematic
relationship between a defendant’s wrongdoing and the type of
harm that had befallen the plaintiff. 105 The following case
provides an illustration.
In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 106 the defendant, a
popular Los Angeles radio station that broadcast to a
predominately teenage audience, started a promotional to
increase its listener base.107 One of its disk jockeys, “The Real
Don Steele,” drove a red muscle car to various locations in the
Los Angeles area, while another disk jockey back at the station
announced his changing destinations.108 Under the rules of the
contest, the first listener who caught up with the traveling disk
jockey won a cash prize. 109 Two teenagers independently
pursued Don Steele, reaching speeds up to eighty miles per
hour.110 In their zeal to catch up with Steele, one of them
“forced [the] decedent’s car on to a center divider where it
overturned.”111 In the lawsuit that inevitably followed, the jury
returned a verdict against the two teenagers and the radio
foreseeability obfuscates the judicial process and likely undermines its
perceived legitimacy.” ).
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 29 (2010) (“An actor’s liability
is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
conduct tortious.”); DOBBS, supra note 73, § 187, at 463–64 (“[The essence of
foreseeability is that] the scope of the defendant’s liability is determined by
the scope of the risk he negligently created . . . . When courts say that [a] risk
is unforeseeable what they mean is that it is not a risk enhanced or created by
the defendant’s conduct.”); Grady, supra note 3, at 323 (stating that a plaintiff
must show that the untaken precaution would have reduced the risk of the
accident at issue to prevail on proximate cause grounds).
105. Grady, supra note 3, at 323–24; Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1271
(“[T]he plaintiff’s injury must correlate with that aspect of the defendant’s
conduct that was negligent.”).
106. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
107. Id. at 38.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 39.
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station as joint tortfeasors.112 The California Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, finding that the accident was a
foreseeable consequence of the contest and the way it was
conducted. 113 The accident and injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs were foreseeable because of a systematic relationship
between an opportunity designed to appeal to teenagers and
the predictable recklessness of the youngsters. 114 The teens
who lacked maturity and the assets to pay a judgment were
more susceptible to such behavior than responsible adults.115
Coincidental harm is generally unforeseeable, even where
factually caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. For instance,
suppose a driver exceeded a speed limit and arrived at a spot
just in time to be struck by a falling tree. Although the driver’s
speeding caused the accident, the accident is outside the scope
of risk created by the speeding.116 The driver’s speeding created
risks of certain types of traffic accidents, but it neither created
nor enhanced the risk of falling trees. 117 The accident is
coincidental and not systematically related to the driver’s
negligence, hence unforeseeable.118 The outcome would likely
have been different if instead a tree had fallen in front of the
speeding driver, and the car collided with it.119 If the accident
could have been avoided had the driver travelled at a
reasonable speed, the driver’s speeding may in those
circumstances have been a proximate cause of the accident.120
112. Id.
113. Id. at 40 (“We conclude that the record amply supports the finding of
foreseeability.”).
114. Id. (“It was foreseeable that defendant’s youthful listeners, finding the
prize had eluded them at one location, would race to arrive first at the next
site and in their haste would disregard the demands of highway safety.”).
115. See Mark F. Grady, The Free Radicals of Tort, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
189, 189–91 (2004).
116. See, e.g., Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 73, § 187, at 463–64 (“When courts say
that [a] risk is unforeseeable what they mean is that it is not a risk enhanced
or created by the defendant’s conduct.”); Grady, supra note 3, at 324.
119. Berry, 43 A. at 240 (“It might have been otherwise if the tree had
fallen before the car reached it, for in that case a high rate of speed might
have rendered it impossible for the plaintiff to avoid a collision which he either
foresaw or should have foreseen.”).
120. Id.
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Failure to stop within a short time window to avoid a collision
is a foreseeable risk of speeding.121
Intervening events between the defendant’s wrongdoing
and the plaintiff’s harm, however complex or bizarre, do not
deny foreseeability as long as there is no intervening tort or
crime, and as long as the ultimate harm is systematically
related to the defendant’s wrongdoing. 122 The exact
concatenation of events need not be foreseeable.123 The type of
injury suffered by the plaintiff must be foreseeable, rather than
its extent or manner of occurrence. 124 Two famous cases,
Bunting v. Hogsett125 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,126 provide good illustrations.
In Bunting, the defendant owned a furnace, and used a
small railroad to carry supplies to his furnace on a dinky
train.127 The small railroad formed a circle that crossed the
121. See id.; see also Grady, supra note 3, at 324.
122. See Grady, supra note 3, at 304–05.
123. See, e.g., Stodola v. Grunwald Mech. Contractors, Inc., 422 N.W.2d
341, 344 (Neb. 1988) (“The law does not require precision in foreseeing the
exact hazard or consequence which happens. It is sufficient if what occurs is
one of the kind of consequences which might reasonably be foreseen.”); Hughes
v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L.) 850 (appeal taken from Scot.) (“It is
true that the duty of care expected in cases of this sort is confined to
reasonably foreseeable dangers, but it does not necessarily follow that liability
is escaped because the danger actually materializing is not identical with the
danger reasonably foreseen and guarded against.”); DOBBS, supra note 73, §
189, at 467 (explaining the risk rule of foreseeability to say, “if I foresee the
risk in general, I need not foresee the details”); see also JOHN W. SALMOND,
THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY FOR CIVIL
INJURIES 719 (4th ed. 1965) (“Type of damage must be foreseen . . . . [P]recise
details of the accident need not be foreseen . . . . The question is, was the
accident a variant of the perils originally brought about by the defendant’s
negligence?”).
124. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 189, at 466 (“The defendant is liable for
harms he negligently caused so long as a reasonable person in his position
should have recognized or foreseen the general kind of harm the plaintiff
suffered. He is not ordinarily relieved of liability merely because the manner
of injury or its details were unforeseeable.”); Owen, supra note 1, at 1298
(“[R]esponsibility requires only than an actor foresee the type of harm, not the
manner of harm nor the extent of harm.”); see also Grady, supra note 3, at 298
(“[T]he type of intervening event and the type of intervening actor are often
much more significant to the issues of proximate cause than the mere ex ante
probability of the intervening event, whatever it was.”).
125. Bunting v. Hogsett, 21 A. 31 (Pa. 1891).
126. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
127. Bunting, 21 A. at 31.
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Southwest Pennsylvania mainline tracks twice. 128 The
plaintiffs were traveling on a passenger train on the Southwest
Pennsylvania mainline tracks.129 The driver of the dinky train
failed to maintain a proper lookout and did not see the
passenger train approaching the intersection with the dinky
tracks until it was too late to avoid a collision.130 When the
dinky driver realized a collision was inevitable, he reversed the
engine, shut off the steam, and jumped out.131 The driverless
dinky train collided with the rear end of the passenger train.132
This collision did not cause any injuries to the passengers, but
it reopened the throttle on the dinky train, causing it to reverse
back along the dinky tracks.133
In the meantime the engineer on the passenger train had
applied his airbrakes, which brought the passenger train to a
halt exactly at the second intersection with the dinky tracks.134
By now, the driverless dinky train was on its way back to the
second intersection. 135 The engineer of the passenger train
knew a second collision was imminent, but was unable to
prevent it because his airbrakes had been applied.136 The dinky
engine crashed into the stationary passenger train, causing
serious injuries to the plaintiffs.137
Injured passengers on the passenger train filed suit
against the owner of the dinky line.138 The jury found that the
defendant’s dinky engineer had been negligent in failing to
keep a lookout.139 The defendant appealed and the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiffs.140
Although the accident resulted from a highly unforeseeable
sequence of events, the plaintiffs’ harm was a foreseeable
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Grady, supra note 3, at 304.
130. Bunting, 21 A. at 32.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Grady, supra note 3, at 304–05.
140. Bunting, 21 A. at 32.
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consequence of the defendant’s untaken precaution.141 There
was clearly a systematic relationship between the dinky
driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout in a traffic intersection
and a collision in that intersection142 Furthermore, no tort or
crime intervened between the defendant’s untaken precaution
and the collision.143
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,144 as in Bunting,
an unusual sequence of events intervened between the
defendant’s wrongful act and the plaintiff’s injury. Unlike
Bunting however, the defendant in Palsgraf escaped liability,
not because of the intervening events, but because the type of
accident was unforeseeable.145
Helen Palsgraf, a cleaning lady from Brooklyn, was
standing on a platform of the defendant’s railroad waiting to
board a train.146 A train departed from the station at the other
end of the platform, and two men ran forward to catch it.147
One of the men managed to board the moving train without
mishap.148 The other man, who was carrying a package, jumped
aboard the car while a guard on the car held the door open and
pulled him in and another guard on the platform pushed him
from behind. 149 In the scuffle, the passenger dropped his
package and it fell on the rails. 150 The package contained
fireworks that ignited on impact and exploded.151 The shock of
the explosion toppled some mail scales at the other end of the
platform.152 The scales fell on the plaintiff, causing injuries for
141. Id.; Grady, supra note 3, at 305 (“The type of harm that the plaintiffs
sustained, namely, collision harm, was exactly the type that the dinky
engineer should have predicted when he neglected to look out for the
passenger train.”).
142. Grady, supra note 3, at 305 (“[A] highly systematic relationship exists
between a train collision and an engineer’s failure to maintain a lookout.”).
143. Bunting, 21 A. at 31.
144. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
145. Id. at 99.
146. Id. at 100–01.
147. Id. at 99.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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which she sued.153 No one in the station, except the passenger
with the package and his companion, had any reason to know
that the package contained explosives.154
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
and the jury found for the plaintiff.155 The appellate division
affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.156 The New York Court
of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.157 Writing for
the majority, Judge Cardozo ruled that the defendant’s
wrongful act created no foreseeable risk of injury to Mrs.
Palsgraf. 158 There is only a minimal, if any, systematic
relationship between pulling a passenger onto a moving train
and a scale toppling onto a person some distance away.159
Natural events and unusual “acts of God” beyond the
defendant’s control preserve a defendant’s liability, provided
the type of harm is foreseeable and there is no intervening tort
or crime.160 In Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co.,161 the
defendant’s negligence caused flammable gas to accumulate in
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 101.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 99 (“The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the
plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all.
Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the
potency of peril to persons thus removed.”); Thomas A. Cowan, The Riddle of
the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 48 (1938) (“[I]f negligent at all, [the
defendant] had been negligent toward the passenger; [but] no duty of care was
owed to Mrs. Palsgraf since no risk of injury to her was foreseeable.”); Prosser,
supra note 79, at 5 (“The conduct of the guards toward the passenger involved
no foreseeable risk that the plaintiff might be injured.”).
159. See Grady, supra note 22, at 114 (“The Court of Appeals of New York,
in a famous majority decision by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, held that the
plaintiff could not recover because the accident was not ‘reasonably
foreseeable’ to the defendant.”). According to dissenting Judge Andrews, the
distance between the incident and the falling scales was “apparently twenty-
five or thirty feet,” but regarding this distance, “[t]here was no plat in
evidence, and Andrews could not have known, unless there was some
statement of counsel.” Prosser, supra note 79, at 3 n.10.
160. See DOBBS, supra note 73, §191, at 475 (explaining that if a defendant
is harmed as a result of a concurrence of an unforeseeable natural event and
the defendant’s negligence, the defendant remains liable for the harm); Grady,
supra note 3, at 303.
161. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933).
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the hold of a barge on which the decedents were working.162
Lightning struck and ignited the gas, killing the workers.163
The defendant was held liable.164 The harm suffered by the
plaintiffs was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
negligence.165 There is a systematic relationship between an act
of negligence that allows combustible gas to accumulate and a
subsequent explosion when the gas is ignited. 166 The
intervention of the lightning bolt did not cut off the defendant’s
liability, because it was a natural event. 167 An intervening
event may affect the foreseeability analysis, however, if
scientists could not have predicted the event—the topic of the
next Part.
IV. REASONABLE IGNORANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Foreseeability of an event is not necessarily a reflection of
its objective probability. Rather, it is a reflection of what a
reasonable person would foresee under the circumstances.168
This degree of foresight may be equal to the objective
probability of the event, or it may be a fraction thereof.169 The
fraction may be zero if the defendant is reasonably ignorant of
the systematic relationship between her wrongful act and a
162. Id. at 194.
163. Id. at 194–96.
164. Id. at 197.
165. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 189, at 470 (“Although it might not be
foreseeable that lightning would strike the barge and ignite the gases, it was
foreseeable that some intervening incendiary force would ignite them.”);
Johnson, 64 F.2d at 197 (“The danger of the injurious result was over present,
even though the manner in which, or the means by which, such result was
brought about may have had in it some aspect of unusualness.”).
166. See Grady, supra note 3, at 299.
167. Johnson, 64 F.2d at 195–97 (“This case does not fall within that class
of cases . . . where a secondary efficient cause intervenes to break the chain of
causation and so becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury.”).
168. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 94
(1999); Lara Khoury & Stuart Smyth, Reasonable Foreseeability and Liability
in Relation to Genetically Modified Organisms, 27 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y
215, 224 (2007) (“The test [for foreseeability] is essentially objective, but
knowledge available at the time of the events must be taken into account.”).
169. Cardi, supra note 67, at 939 (“[F]oreseeability measures the fragment
of objective probability that a reasonable person could have or should have—
depending on the context of the decision—foreseen under the circumstances.”).
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plaintiff’s injury. 170 The Reasonable Ignorance of the
Relationship doctrine, proposed by Professor Mark Grady,
formalizes this concept. 171 Under the doctrine, proximate
causality is cut off due to absence of foreseeability when, even
though ex post there is clearly a systematic relationship
between the defendant’s untaken precaution and the plaintiff’s
harm, “scientists would not have predicted the relationship ex
ante.” 172 In this special case, there is no liability. 173 The
defendant’s ignorance of the systematic relationship must be
objectively reasonable to escape liability under the doctrine.174
A defendant who was subjectively ignorant of a risk may
nevertheless be held liable if a court finds that she should have
known or investigated the risk.175
The remainder of this Part reviews the common law
evolution of the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine and its
application in negligence cases where the defendant’s
wrongdoing created a novel risk, such as when a new
technology or unexplored scientific principle contributed to the
plaintiff’s harm.
170. See id.
171. See generally Grady, supra note 3, at 328.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also Khoury & Smyth, supra note 168, at 225–26 (discussing
how uncertainty as to the impact of biotechnological activities makes it “less
likely it is that the courts will find that [an] injury was foreseeable”);
Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1257 (“Imagine a plaintiff arguing that a developer
could have cheaply rendered the fireplace in a house more heat-resistant by
using a specially engineered, low-cost resin. Is it relevant whether the
technology for the resin was available or discoverable to a reasonable architect
when the house was built? Of course it is.”).
174. LUNTZ ET AL., supra note 85, at 132 (“The question is not what the
defendant personally could have foreseen, but what a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant could reasonably have foreseen.”).
175. Owen, supra note 1, at 1292 (“[P]rudence sometimes requires actors to
investigate and evaluate possibilities of hidden or inchoate risk.”); Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 506 n.207
(1992) (“Blame is assignable not just where the agent acts with knowledge of
fairly specific facts, say that a certain action will or might cause a certain
harm. It is also assignable where the agent knows that he ought not to act
without first obtaining knowledge of the specific facts (knows that he ought to
know, for short).”).
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A. CLASSIC CASES
In the classic case, Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Engineering Co.,176 a tank ship, the Wagon Mound, was
loading furnace oil at the Caltex Wharf in Sydney, Australia.177
The Wagon Mound negligently discharged flammable oil into
the water that spread over the bay and under the plaintiff’s
wharf.178 The plaintiffs were ship builders and repairers, and
their employees were doing welding work on a ship, the
Corrimal.179 The plaintiff’s operations manager saw the oil on
the water, and gave instructions that no welding was to be
done.180 He then discussed the situation with the manager of
the Caltex Wharf, who assured him that it was safe for normal
welding operations to continue because there was no apparent
fire hazard.181 The fuel oil floating on the water could not ignite
because the oil could not normally reach its flashpoint of 170
degrees Fahrenheit (77 degrees Celsius) while floating on the
surface of the water. 182 With this reassurance, welding
operations resumed.183
After a while, the oil caught fire, causing substantial
damage to the plaintiff’s wharf, the Corrimal, and another ship
docked in the vicinity. 184 The oil ignited in an unusual manner.
Some debris attached to a piece of cotton had been floating on
the water under the oil layer, invisible to any observer.185 A
welder’s torch set off sparks that struck the cotton. 186 The
cotton smoldered for a while and eventually acquired sufficient
heat to ignite the oil, causing the fire that burned down the
dock.187
176. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon
Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.) (U.K.).
177. Id. at 412.
178. Id. at 413.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See BARKER ET AL., supra note 98, at 559.
183. Overseas Tankship, [1961] A.C. at 413.
184. Id. at 413–15.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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The dock owner sued the charterers of the Wagon Mound,
alleging that the destruction of his wharf was caused by the
negligence of the defendants’ employees.188 The Supreme Court
of New South Wales found that the defendant was reasonably
ignorant of the fact that the oil could ignite while spread on the
water. 189 However, the Court was compelled to follow the
precedent of Polemis, 190 which allowed recovery for direct
consequences of a defendant’s negligence, regardless of
foreseeability.191 The Supreme Court of New South Wales held
the Wagon Mound defendants liable under Polemis because
there were no intervening causes between the defendant’s act
and the plaintiff’s damage. 192 Justice Manning nevertheless
expressed the hope that the House of Lords or the Privy
Council would “pronounce on the topic in terms that would
facilitate its everyday application to current problems.”193
Justice Manning got his wish. On appeal, the Privy Council
overturned Polemis, and established a liability standard based
on foreseeability.194 The oil spill created several risks, including
hazards associated with water pollution and fire.195 The risk of
pollution was foreseeable, but did not cause the harm
complained of.196 The fire hazard was unforeseeable, because of
the physical nature of the oil and the fact that the debris and
cotton were out of sight.197 The court accepted the testimony of
a “distinguished scientist” that the defendants could not
reasonably have foreseen that the particular kind of oil would
188. Id. at 412–13.
189. Id.
190. See In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
191. Id.
192. Overseas Tankship, [1961] A.C. at 414.
193. Id. at 390.
194. Id. at 418–20 (“After the event, even a fool is wise. But it is not the
hindsight of a fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can
determine responsibility . . . . But if it would be wrong that a man should be
held liable for damage unpredictable by a reasonable man because it was
‘direct’ or ‘natural,’ equally it would be wrong that he should escape liability,
however ‘indirect’ the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably foresee the
intervening events which led to its being done . . . . Thus foreseeability
becomes the effective test.”).
195. Id. at 388–89.
196. Id. at 389.
197. Id.
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be flammable when spread on water. 198 The Privy Council
therefore denied liability on foreseeability grounds, finding that
the defendants were reasonably ignorant of the mechanism by
which the plaintiff’s harm occurred.199
In Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co.,200 a technician
negligently knocked the cover off a vat containing molten
sodium cyanide into the liquid in the vat.201 The cover was
made of a combination of asbestos and cement known as
sindanyo.202 A chemical reaction between the molten liquid and
the sindanyo caused an eruption that resulted in burn injuries
to the plaintiffs.203 The risk that the cover might splash the
molten liquid onto bystanders was foreseeable, but the
chemical reaction that actually caused the harm was unknown
and unpredictable at the time of the accident.204 Scientists later
discovered that at sufficiently high temperatures the sindanyo
compound would undergo a chemical change that creates
steam.205 Steam created in this manner caused the eruption
that injured the plaintiff in Doughty. 206 This process was
unknown to scientists at the time of the accident, and the
compound of sindanyo was, until the accident occurred, thought
to be safe for the purpose it was used for.207
The court held in favor of the defendant.208 Even though ex
post there was clearly a systematic relationship between the
defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s injuries, the
defendant was unaware of the relationship at the time of the
198. Id. at 413.
199. Id. (“The raison d’être of furnace oil is, of course, that it shall burn,
but I find the [appellants] did not know and could not reasonably be expected
to have known that it was capable of being set afire when spread on water.”).
200. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 518 (C.A. 1963).
201. Id. at 519.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 522.
205. Id. at 519.
206. Id. at 519–20.
207. Id. at 518–19 (“Nobody supposed that if the covers were immersed
into the cauldron, any serious consequences would result . . . . When the lid
dropped into the liquid, nobody was alarmed, and two bystanders actually
moved closer to peer into the bath.”).
208. Id. at 524.
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accident.209 The defendant therefore escaped liability under the
Reasonable Ignorance doctrine.210
In Tremain v. Pike,211 the claimant, an employee of the
defendant, contracted a rare disease known as Weil’s disease,
allegedly due to rat infestation on the defendant’s farm. 212
Weil’s disease is a form of leptospirosis that is caused by
bacteria known as leptospires.213 Leptospires are present in
rats that are carriers of the disease, and are passed from the
kidneys to the urine of infected rats.214 Justice Payne held that
the defendant had not breached his duty to the plaintiff in the
circumstances of the case, but added that even if the defendant
had been in breach, he would not be liable because the type of
harm suffered by the plaintiff was not a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of rat infestation. 215 Although the medical
profession and officials in the Ministry of Agriculture were
familiar with the condition known as Weil’s disease, evidence
before the court suggested that the defendants-farmers were
reasonably ignorant of the disease.216
209. Id. at 519–20.
210. Cf. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 520, 524–25 (C.A.
1963); DOBBS, supra note 73, § 189, at 468 (“The chemical reaction had been
completely unknown up until that time, so the eruption by this means was
entirely unforeseeable.”); Marc Stauch, Risk and Remoteness of Damage in
Negligence, 64 MOD. L. REV. 191, 203 (“[E]ven where a general link between
the faulty conduct and the harm is apparent, the presence of the further
causal condition in the background environment, and its potential to combine
with the faulty conduct in the causal set for harm, must have been known of
at the time of the conduct.”).
211. Tremain v. Pike, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1556 (Eng.).
212. Id. at 1559 (“It follows from the evidence that . . . an increase in the
rat population on a farm increases the risk of infection with leptospirosis.”).
213. Id. at 1558.
214. See, e.g., THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 1104–05
(Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 2d Home ed. 2003) (describing of leptospirosis and
Weil’s disease).
215. Tremain, [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 1560–61 (“If, contrary to my view, it
should be held that the defendants were in breach of duty . . . [defendants] are
still immune from liability on the grounds that Weil’s disease was at best a
remote possibility which they could not reasonably foresee, and that the
damage suffered by the plaintiff was, therefore, unforeseeable and too remote
to be recoverable.”).
216. Id. at 1559 (“Knowledge of Weil’s disease in this country is as rare as
the disease itself. The evidence before me suggests that it is known to medical
officers of health, public health inspectors and some officers of the Ministry of
Agriculture, and a bulletin on the Control of Rats and Mice, published by the
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If the risk at issue were described as “illness due to rat
infestation,” the plaintiff’s harm would be foreseeable.217 Rat
infestation creates multiple risks, including foreseeable risks
such as illness related to rat bites and poisoning by
consumption of rat-contaminated food.218 However, the court
ruled that the foreseeability inquiry should be based on the
specific risk of Weil’s disease, because it is distinct from the
foreseeable class of rodent-borne diseases.219 The defendants
therefore escaped liability because they were reasonably
ignorant of the specific disease contracted by the plaintiff and
the mechanism by which it was transmitted.220
When scientific knowledge advances and new information
becomes available, courts may decide that a once obscure risk
has become foreseeable, and decline to allow a defendant the
benefit of the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine.221 Decades after
Ministry in 1961, and reprinted in 1967, refers to this disease amongst others,
but this booklet has not been issued to farmers or circulated through the
National Farmers Union. There is no evidence before me to suggest that
farmers know, or reasonably ought to know, of this disease. The defendant,
Leonard Pike, had never heard of it . . . . Two witnesses . . . had not heard of
the disease, and did not know that one could get any disease by handling
matter contaminated by rats.”).
217. See, e.g., MICHAEL JONES, TEXTBOOK ON TORTS 242 (6th ed. 1998) (“If
the question had been: Was illness from some rat-transmitted disease
foreseeable? The answer would surely have been yes. Rats are associated with
disease but few people could specify which diseases are foreseeable.”).
218. See Tremain, [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 1560–61.
219. Id. at 1561 (“The kind of damage suffered here was a disease
contracted by contact with rat’s urine. This, in my view, was entirely different
in kind from [foreseeable harms such as] the effect of a rat-bite, or food
poisoning by the consumption of food or drink contaminated by rats. I do not
accept that all illness or infection arising from an infestation of rats should be
regarded as of the same kind.”); id. at 1556 (noting that Weil’s disease is the
only known rodent-borne disease that is not transmitted by rat bites or food
contamination.).
220. Id. at 1556.
221. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 75, at 185 (“As scientific knowledge
advances . . . what was excusable ignorance yesterday becomes negligent
ignorance today.”); CAROLYN SAPPIDEEN ET AL., TORTS COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 221 (11th ed. 2012) (“What is foreseeable can therefore change
according to circumstances as knowledge develops.”); Khoury & Smyth, supra
note 168, at 224 (“[T]he exchange of information within the research
community as well as research efforts . . . are likely to have a direct impact on
the courts’ [foreseeability analysis]. The level of knowledge prevalent in the
industry may give courts some indication of what they can expect reasonable
foresight to consist of at a particular point in time.”).
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Tremain, in Campbell v. Percy Bilton, an employee of the
defendants contracted Weil’s disease after coming into contact
with rat urine in water that had accumulated in crevices and
steel girders on a building site.222 This time the court held for
the plaintiff.223 The disease had become much more widespread
than in 1969 when Tremain was decided, and the hazard was
well known in the particular working environment. 224 The
defendant could not rely on a pleading of reasonable ignorance
of the risk because Weil’s disease had become a known and
foreseeable consequence of rat infestation.
B. LEVEL OF ABSTRACTION
The foreseeability of a risk depends on the level of
abstraction at which it is defined. The risk at issue in Doughty
v. Turner225 may be described as “injury by splashing of molten
metal,” which is foreseeable.226 At a lower level of abstraction,
the risk may be described more precisely as “injury by
splashing of molten metal due to an unknown chemical
reaction.”227 A court that accepted the latter description would
likely rule that the risk was unforeseeable.228 A defendant has
the apparent incentive to describe a risk as precisely as
possible, while the plaintiff would want to describe it as
generally as possible. 229 A defendant cannot, however,
manipulate the foreseeability issue to its advantage by defining
a risk arbitrarily precisely. 230 Regardless of how a risk is
presented to a court, a defendant’s liability will be preserved if
the court finds that the specific risk at issue is substantially
similar to, or a mere variant of a foreseeable risk or class of
risks.231 The following case provides an illustration.
222. For a discussion of this case, see JOHN HODGSON & JOHN
LEWTHWAITE, TORT LAW 73 (2d ed. 2012).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 518 (C.A. 1963).
226. See DOBBS, supra note 73, § 189, at 468–69.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Stodola v. Grunwald Mech. Contractors, Inc., 422 N.W.2d
341, 344 (Neb. 1988) (“The law does not require precision in foreseeing the
exact hazard or consequence which happens. It is sufficient if what occurs is
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In Bradford v. Robinson Rentals, 232 the plaintiff was a
fifty-seven-year-old mobile radio and television service engineer
who frequently travelled in a small van in the course of his
employment. 233 During the winter of 1963, his employer
required him to travel to a distant location to exchange one van
for another.234 His employer knew the weather would be severe,
with temperatures likely to dip below freezing point, and that
he would have to drive at least twenty hours in these
conditions.235 Because of the plaintiff’s protracted exposure to
freezing weather and fatigue from driving under stressful
conditions, circulation in his hands and feet stagnated and he
suffered frostbite, 236 an unusual condition even in the cold
winters of England.237 The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s
injury was unusual and therefore not reasonably foreseeable.238
The court disagreed and held that although the defendant
one of the kind of consequences which might reasonably be foreseen.”);
Parsons v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., [1978] Q.B. 791 (holding that the risk of
intestinal disease in pigs included the unforeseeable risk of E. coli infection);
Rowark v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1978] R 480, 1986 WL 1255199 (finding that the
plaintiff’s unusual injury, tenosynovitis, is no more than a specific variant of
foreseeable injuries such as strains or sprains.); Bradford v. Robinson Rentals,
[1967] 1 W.L.R. 337 (Eng.) (holding that the risk of frostbite is unforeseeable
but substantially similar to a foreseeable risk such as chilblains); SALMOND,
supra note 123, at 719 (“Type of damage must be foreseen . . . . [P]recise
details of the accident need not be foreseen . . . . The question is, was the
accident a variant of the perils originally brought about by the defendant’s
negligence?”); Grady, supra note 22, at 114 (“The basic purpose of reasonable-
foresight proximate cause is to cut off liability for . . . accidents that are not
mere variants of those that were ex ante foreseeable.”).
232. Bradford, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 337.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 341.
236. See JOHN MARX, ROSEN’S EMERGENCY MEDICINE: CONCEPTS AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 1862 (7th ed. 2010) (“Frostbite is the medical condition
where localized damage is caused to skin and other tissues due to extreme
cold.”); see also Alexander Golant et al., Cold Exposure Injuries to the
Extremities, 16 J. AM. ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 704, 704–15 (2008).
237. Bradford, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 342; see also Rowark v. Nat’l Coal Bd.
[1978] R 480, 1986 WL 1255199 (“[In] Bradford v. Robinson Rentals . . . the
injury suffered by the plaintiff was frost-bite, a condition which is very rare, if
indeed it is known at all, to occur at the levels of temperature that we have in
this country. It had been argued that frost-bite was not a foreseeable injury.”).
238. Bradford, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 342.
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could not foresee the specific injury,239 it was of the same “type
and kind” as injuries that typically result from exposure to
extreme cold, such as chilblains.240 The plaintiff’s injury was
therefore a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ breach
of duty.241
The court’s position appears logical. The conditions of
frostbite and chilblains are similar and are in fact often
confused. 242 Both are caused by exposure to extreme cold,
although frostbite is more severe than chilblains—a chilblain is
a nonfreezing tissue injury, 243 while frostbite is a freezing
condition.244 Neither the rarity of frostbite245 nor its unusual
severity 246 makes it unforeseeable. The defendant’s liability
was therefore properly preserved.
In Bradford, the defendant was held liable—although the
specific risk was unforeseeable, it was similar to a foreseeable
239. Id. at 344.
240. Id. Chilblains is a painful, itching swelling on the skin, typically on a
hand or foot, caused by poor circulation in the skin when exposed to cold. It is
relatively common in Britain. See R. John Gourlay, The Problem of Chilblains
with a Note on Their Treatment with Nicotinic Acid, BRITISH MED. J. 336, 336
(1948).
241. Bradford, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 346.
242. Homeopathy for Chilblains, HOMEOPATHY FOR EVERYONE (May 16,
2014), http://treatment.hpathy.com/homeo-medicine/homeopathy-chilblains/
(“Chilblains is a medical condition that is often confused with frostbite and
trench foot.”).
243. THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION, supra note 214, at
1656.
244. C. Imray et al., Cold Damage to the Extremities: Frostbite and Non-
Freezing Cold Injuries, 85 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 481, 481 (2009) (“Frostbite
is defined as true tissue freezing caused by heat loss sufficient to cause ice
crystal formation in superficial or deep tissues.”).
245. Cf. BAGARIC ET AL., supra note 69, at 168, 233; Grady, supra note 22.
246. See, e.g., Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L.) 845 (appeal
taken from Scot.) (“[A] defender is liable, although the damage may be a good
deal greater in extent than was foreseeable. He can only escape liability if the
damage can be regarded as differing in kind from what was foreseeable.”);
DOBBS, supra note 73, § 188, at 464 (stating that a defendant’s liability is
preserved “if he could reasonably foresee the nature of the harm done, even if
the total amount of harm turned out to be quite unforeseeably large”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435); LUNTZ ET AL., supra note 85, at 132
(stating that the defendant is liable for damage that is of the same kind as
that which was reasonably foreseeable, “even though its extent may have been
unforeseeable”).
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class of risks.247 In cases where a specific risk is unforeseeable
as well as distinct from foreseeable risks, courts typically deny
liability. 248 In Fox v. Estrada, the Court distinguished the
unforeseeable risk of HIV/AIDS (at the time) from known and
foreseeable blood-borne risks, based on the unique behavior of
HIV inside the body of an infected person.249 In Doughty v.
Turner, the court distinguished the risk of splashing a hot
liquid due to an unknown chemical reaction from the known
risk of splashing due to mechanical action.250 In Tremain v.
Pike, the court distinguished an unknown bacterial disease
that is transmitted through human contact with rodent urine
from foreseeable rodent-transmitted diseases. 251 In Estrada,
Tremain, and Doughty, the defendant’s wrongdoing created
multiple risks, some of which were foreseeable, some not.252
The risk that injured the plaintiff was unforeseeable and
distinct from the foreseeable risks.253 Novel and unexpected
factors such as an unknown chemical reaction in Doughty and
obscure diseases in Estrada and Tremain distinguished the
respective materialized risks, enabling the defendant to escape
liability under the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine.254
The next Part presents an analysis of the common law
evolution of the foreseeability issue and the Reasonable
Ignorance doctrine in a special class of cases, namely
HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk.
247. Bradford, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 344, 346.
248. DOBBS, supra note 73, § 189, at 468–69.
249. Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *3–4 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998) (describing distinctive features of HIV/AIDS).
250. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 522 (C.A. 1963).
251. Tremain v. Pike, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1556, 1560–61 (U.K.).
252. See Doughty, [1964] 1 Q.B. at 522; Fox, 1998 WL 831666, at *3–4;
Tremain, [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 1560–61.
253. See Doughty, [1964] 1 Q.B. at 522; Fox, 1998 WL 831666, at *3–4;
Tremain, [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 1560–61.
254. See Doughty, [1964] 1 Q.B. at 522; Fox, 1998 WL 831666, at *3–4;
Tremain, [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 1560–61.
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V. HIV/AIDS BLOOD TRANSFUSION CASES
A. INTRODUCTION TOHIV
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a retrovirus that
causes progressive failure of the human immune response,
culminating in the degenerative disease known as AIDS.255 The
major mechanisms of HIV transmission are exposure to body
fluids of an infected person, use of contaminated needles, and
perinatal (mother to newborn baby) transmission. 256 Two
subtypes of HIV are known, HIV-1 and HIV-2.257 HIV-1 is more
virulent and infective, and is the major cause of the global
AIDS epidemic.258 HIV-2 is much less pathogenic and is mainly
found in West African countries.259
255. See MICHAELD. JOHNSON, HUMAN BIOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND CURRENT
ISSUES 199–200 (2d ed. 2003) (“A syndrome is a medical term for a group of
symptoms that occur together, and acquired means that one catches it.”);
Anna Forsman & Robin A. Weiss, Why Is HIV a Pathogen?, 16 TRENDS
MICROBIOLOGY 555, 557 (“AIDS was named a syndrome because as an end-
stage disease it is manifested by a variety of severe symptoms.”); Hermann,
supra note 18, at 63–64 (“AIDS is an impairment of the human body’s natural
immune system of defense against disease that renders a person vulnerable to
infections and various illnesses. The damage to the immune system
results . . . as a consequence of infection with HIV. AIDS is an acquired
condition rather than an inherited one, and it is a syndrome in that it is
constituted by a number of symptoms and conditions that characterize the
disorder.” ); see also Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560–61 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“The essential point to understand is that HIV doesn’t cause illness
directly. What it does is weaken and eventually destroy the body’s immune
system. As the immune system falters, the body becomes prey to diseases that
the system protects us against. These ‘opportunistic’ diseases that HIV allows,
as it were, to ravage the body are exotic cancers and rare forms of pneumonia
and other infectious diseases. To refer to them as ‘complications’ of HIV or
AIDS is not incorrect, but it is misleading, because they are the chief worry of
anyone who has the misfortune to be afflicted with AIDS.”).
256. See JOHNSON, supra note 255, at 200–01; Keith A. Crandall, Human
Immunodeficiency Viruses (HIV), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SCIENCES 4
(2001); Viviana Simon et al., HIV/AIDS Epidemiology, Pathogenesis,
Prevention, and Treatment, 368 LANCET 489, 496–98 (2006).
257. See Norman L. Letvin, Strategies for an HIV Vaccine, 110 J. CLINICAL
INVESTIGATION 15, 15 (2002) (“The HIV responsible for causing AIDS in much
of West Africa is referred to as HIV-2; the HIV that causes AIDS throughout
the rest of the world is referred to as HIV-1.”).
258. See id.
259. Id.; M. Tersmette, The Role of HIV Variability in the Pathogenesis of
AIDS, in IMMUNOLOGY OFHIV INFECTION 31, 31–32 (A.G. Bird ed. 1992).
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The term “retrovirus” 260 refers to a virus family whose
genetic information is encoded in RNA rather than DNA, but
that inserts a DNA copy of its genome into a host cell in order
to replicate. 261 Once integrated into the target cell’s
chromosomes, the virus uses the host cell’s own genetic
material to replicate itself.262 Newly created copies of the virus
are released and infect other cells in turn.263 HIV belongs to a
subgroup of the retrovirus family known as lentiviruses. 264
Lentiviruses derive their name from the Latin for “slow,” and
are characterized by a long incubation period. 265HIV-1 and
HIV-2 are the only known human lentiviruses.266
1. The Stages of HIV Infection
The natural history of HIV infection proceeds through
three well-defined phases: primary infection; an intermediate
phase of clinical latency; and the end stage, clinical illness.267
The primary infection phase may last from a few days to
several weeks and can be clinically asymptomatic or
characterized by influenza-like symptoms such as a fever,
accompanied by a rash and swollen lymph glands.268 At this
stage, HIV replicates actively and kills cells of the immune
system.269 This viral assault is met by a highly targeted and
260. The retrovirus family has three subgroups; HIV belongs to a subgroup
of the retrovirus family known as lentiviruses. Tersmette, supra note 259, at
31–32.
261. M. CICHOKI, LIVINGWITHHIV: A PATIENT’S GUIDE 34 (2009); LAUREN
SOMPAYRAC, HOW PATHOGENIC VIRUSES WORK 59 (2002); Tang et al., supra
note 58, at 135 (“The defining feature of a retrovirus is its ability to convert its
RNA genome to a DNA intermediate . . . . A subsequent reaction . . . results in
the integration of this DNA molecule into host chromosome DNA, where it
resides as a provirus.”).
262. SOMPAYRAC, supra note 261, at 60.
263. Levine, supra note 19, at 428.
264. Tang et al., supra note 58, at 135 (describing HIV as the “prototype
lentivirus”).
265. Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1618.
266. A.S. Fauci & R.C. Desrosiers, Pathogenesis of HIV and SIV, in
RETROVIRUSES 587, 587 (J.M. Coffin et al. eds., 1997), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK19359/.
267. Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1617–18.
268. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58.
269. Id.
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powerful defensive immune response that initially contains the
virus.270
Following primary infection, an intermediate phase of
clinical latency may last several years without clinical
symptoms. 271 The virus is active during this period and
continues to replicate, but at a reduced rate.272 In the early
stages of the phase, the patient is asymptomatic, but can infect
others with the virus. 273 Eventually, the balance of power
between HIV replication and the immune response of the
infected person shifts and HIV gains the upper hand.274 HIV
systematically weakens and ultimately defeats the immune
system, paving the way for AIDS-defining opportunistic
infections.275
2. How HIV Defeats the Immune Response
HIV has several unique features that allow it to evade and
also attack, weaken, and ultimately destroy the immune
system. 276 A high mutation rate 277 and rapid replication
frequency278 combine to make HIV the most variable human
virus known.279 The result is a powerful weapon against the
immune response.280
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58; Robin A. Weiss, How Does
HIV Cause AIDS?, 260 SCIENCE 1273, 1273–74 (1993) (explaining that AIDS
“is the end-stage disease of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection”
and that “various opportunistic infections” result).
276. See supra Part I.A; see also Mario Stevenson, HIV-1 Pathogenesis, 9
NATURE MED. 853, 853 (2003); B. Matija Peterlin & Didier Trono, Hide,
Shield and Strike Back: How HIV-Infected Cells Avoid Immune Eradication, 3
NATURE REV. IMMUNOLOGY 97 (2003).
277. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Letvin, supra note
257, at 15 (“[T]he inaccurate enzymatic machinery of this virus’s replication
results in ongoing production of mutant virions.”).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47; see also Stevenson, supra
note 276, at 853 (“[V]iral replication is rapid and efficient.”).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 47.
280. Johnston & Fauci, supra note 37, at 888 (“The extraordinary
mutability and resulting genetic diversity of HIV, which is substantially more
than that of other human viruses, also present a formidable obstacle to
immune control.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 59 (“[The high
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i. Replication
The pathogenesis of HIV is a direct consequence of its
rapid replication rate.281 Once HIV enters the bloodstream of
an infected person, it attaches to specialized cells of the
immune system, such as the T-cell (CD4+ lymphocyte).282 The
virus replicates inside the host immune cell, and eventually the
sheer volume of viral replication overwhelms and kills the cell
by monopolizing the cell’s resources and disrupting the cell
membrane.283 When the expired host cell bursts open, newly
created copies of the virus are scattered back into the blood
stream to continue the process of infection and replication.284
As a result of the systematic destruction of immune cells, the
genetic variability] increases the probability that some genetic change will
give rise to an advantageous trait.”); J. Zhuang et al., Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Recombination: Rate, Fidelity, and Putative
Hot Spots, 76 J. VIROLOGY 11,273, 11,273 (2002) (“The . . . [HIV-1] genome in
nature is characterized by its rapid evolution, which permits the virus to
escape immune surveillance and to develop drug-resistant variants as well as
making it difficult to produce an effective vaccine.”).
281. John M. Coffin, HIV Population Dynamics in Vivo: Implications for
Genetic Variation, Pathogenesis, and Therapy, 267 SCIENCE 483, 488 (1995)
(“[T]he engine that is driving the [immunodeficiency] process is the constant
repeated cycles of virus replication.”); Stevenson, supra note 276, at 858
(“[V]iral pathogenicity is a consequence of both the direct effects of viral
replication on infected cells and its indirect effects on uninfected cells.”).
282. The human immune system consists of two basic cell types, B-cells
and T-cells. B-cells are responsible for the production of antibodies, while T-
cells play a central role in cell-mediated immune response, assist B-cells in
producing antibodies, and kill infected cells in the body. See generally Nat’l
Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, How Vaccines Work, VACCINES (Apr. 19,
2011), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/vaccines/understanding/pages/howwork
.aspx. Macrophages are immune cells that phagocytize (engulf and then
digest) cellular debris and pathogens, and stimulate lymphocytes and other
immune cells to respond to the pathogen. See sources cited supra note 51; see
also Syed Z. Salahuddin et al., Human T Lymphotropic Virus Type III
Infection and Human Alveolar Macrophages, 68 BLOOD 281, 281 (1986)
(“Because macrophages are relatively long-lived cells capable of close
interaction with lymphocytes . . . it is possible that infected macrophages in
vivo could propagate viral infection in the hosts by transfer of virus to
lymphocytes.”).
283. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58.
284. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 634 (1998) (“HIV is a retrovirus,
which means it uses an enzyme to convert its own genetic material into a form
indistinguishable from the genetic material of the target cell . . . . Once
integrated [into the target cell’s chromosomes], the virus can use the cell’s own
genetic machinery to replicate itself. Additional copies of the virus are
released into the body and infect other cells in turn.”).
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immune response gradually weakens and becomes unable to
regenerate or fight off infection.285
Viral replication also kills immune cells indirectly by
inducing an aberrant reaction of the immune system to infected
as well as uninfected bystander cells.286 When an infected cell’s
regulatory functions become compromised because of HIV
replication, the cell may commit suicide by a process known as
programmed cell death, or apoptosis. 287 Uninfected cells in
close proximity to HIV-infected cells may expire when they are
erroneously identified as infected cells and, consequently, are
destroyed by immune cells programmed to eliminate infected
cells.288
ii. Mutation
HIV has a high mutation rate.289 The genetic information
of HIV is encoded in RNA, rather than DNA, but the virus
285. Hermann, supra note 18, at 64 (“AIDS is an impairment of the human
body’s natural immune system of defense against disease that renders a
person vulnerable to infections and various illnesses. The damage to the
immune system results primarily from the destruction of certain crucial white
blood cells—known as T lymphocytes—as a consequence of the infection with
HIV.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58 (“HIV replicates
prodigiously and destroys cells of the immune system each day. But this
growth is met . . . by a vigorous defensive response that [prevents] the virus
from multiplying out of control. Commonly, however, the balance of power
eventually shifts so that HIV gains the upper hand and causes the severe
immune impairment that defines full-blown AIDS.”).
286. Stevenson, supra note 276, at 853 (“HIV-1 infection indirectly impairs
cell function, perhaps because of an aberrant reaction to the infection by the
host’s immune response.”).
287. Marie-Lise Gougeon, Apoptosis as an HIV Strategy To Escape Immune
Attack, 3 NATURE REV. IMMUNOLOGY 392, 392 (2003) (“[I]ncreasing evidence
points to HIV-driven lymphocyte apoptosis as an important contributor to the
destruction of the immune system.”); Weiss, supra note 275, at 1274 (“HIV
infection leads to early priming of lymphocytes for suicide . . . in culture.
[Some scholars] argue that if apoptosis also occurs in vivo to a higher degree
than normal, it could account for helper T cell depletion.”).
288. Gougeon, supra note 287, at 394 (“The mechanisms that are involved
in HIV-associated apoptosis of lymphocytes include . . . death of bystander
cells by pro-apoptotic virus proteins that are released by infected cells.”);
Stevenson, supra note 276, at 858 (“[U]ninfected cells can also undergo
apoptosis, suggesting that HIV-1 replication may be causing collateral
damage.”).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44; see also Letvin, supra note
257, at 15 (“Genetic diversity is also continuously generated in the course of
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must insert a DNA copy of its genome into a host cell in order
to replicate.290 This process requires the action of the reverse
transcriptase enzyme, which copies the viral RNA genome into
a DNA sequence. 291 The virus mutates during this process
because reverse transcriptase is error-prone and has no editing
mechanism for transcriptional errors. 292 HIV reverse
transcriptase is one of the most error-prone reverse
transcriptase enzymes known.293
This high mutation rate helps HIV defeat the immune
response. 294 When a disease-causing pathogen such as HIV
enters the body, the immune response is activated to produce
antibodies.295 Antibodies are proteins that circulate in the blood
of the infected person and bind to the invading pathogen by
locking onto its surface.296 The end of the antibody that binds
with a pathogen varies to match the pathogen it is designed to
recognize.297 A pathogen marked with an antibody signals to
the immune system that the pathogen must be eliminated, and
an HIV infection in a single infected individual, as the inaccurate enzymatic
machinery of this virus’s replication results in ongoing production of mutant
virions.”).
290. See sources cited supra note 261.
291. Tang et al., supra note 58, at 135 (“The defining feature of a retrovirus
is its ability to convert its RNA genome to a DNA intermediate through the
virally encoded reverse transcriptase.”).
292. Zhuang et al., supra note 280, at 11,273 (“[M]utations . . . can be
introduced into the genome during viral DNA synthesis by the viral reverse
transcriptase . . . owing in part to its lack of DNA proofreading activity.”); see
also Roberts et al., supra note 43, at 1171 (noting that reverse transcriptase
has no proof reading ability).
293. Schader & Wainberg, supra note 44.
294. Weiss, supra note 275, at 1277 (“HIV develops sequential escape
mutants to keep one step ahead of the immune response . . . .”).
295. See Julie Overbaugh & Lynn Morris, The Antibody Response Against
HIV-1, 2 CSH PERSP. MED. 1, 2–3 (2012) (“B cell responses to HIV-1 infection
first develop within ~1 week . . . as antigen-antibody complexes. This phase is
followed by circulating . . . antibodies a few days later . . . .”).
296. See id. at 1–10.
297. See generally Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58 (“Activated B
lymphocytes secrete antibodies that recognize specific peptides on the viral
surface. The antibodies mark free viral particles, those not yet sequestered in
cells, for destruction.”); Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 98–102
(discussing the antibody binding process).
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the immune response then induces mechanisms that kill the
pathogen.298
The mutation process disguises the virus by modifying its
outer envelope protein, which is the key target for neutralizing
antibodies. 299 By the time the body produces antibodies
directed at the outer HIV envelope protein, the protein has
mutated to a different form that the antibodies do not
recognize.300 New antibodies are produced in response, but new
mutations repeatedly enable the virus to stay one step ahead of
the immune response. 301 The virus effectively becomes a
moving target by constantly changing its disguise, so that the
antibodies never learn to recognize the latest version of the
virus.302
A mutant virus that has escaped surveillance continues to
replicate.303 Once it infects a new cell, it mutates again.304
298. Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 102 (“Normally, cells that are
infected by a virus are recognized and eliminated by the immune system. This
is due mainly to the surface presentation of viral peptides . . . which allows for
recognition and killing by virus-specific CTLs.”).
299. Johnston & Fauci, supra note 37, at 888 (“By the time the body
produces antibodies directed at the outer HIV envelope protein, which is the
key target for neutralizing antibodies, the protein has mutated in such a way
that the circulating antibodies cannot neutralize it. New antibodies are
induced, but new mutations repeatedly enable the virus to evade the immune
system.”); Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 102 (discussing how HIV
interferes with the ability of cells to send antigen markers to the cell surface
for recognition by the immune system).
300. Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 97 (explaining how HIV evades
the immune system “through mutations that alter recognition of the virus by
virus-specific antibodies”).
301. Margaret I. Johnston & Anthony S. Fauci, An HIV Vaccine—Evolving
Concepts 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2073, 2074 (“The effectiveness of the antibody
response is subsequently thwarted by rapid genetic changes in the envelope
protein that allow the virus to escape recognition by antibodies in circulation
at that time.”); Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 102 (discussing how HIV
interferes with the ability of cells to send antigen markers to the cell surface
for recognition by the immune system).
302. See generally John R. Mascola & David C. Montefiori, HIV-1: Nature’s
Master of Disguise, 9 NATUREMED. 393 (2003).
303. Id. (“This [constant mutation] allows the virus to chronically replicate
and to eventually wear down the body’s defenses by destroying the very cells
necessary to coordinate an effective immune response.”).
304. See SOMPAYRAC, supra note 261, at 70; Nowak & McMichael, supra
note 38, at 60 (estimating that mutations via reverse transcriptase occur at
least once each time HIV integrates into a host cell genome).
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Eventually, the genetic diversity of the viral population in an
infected person overwhelms the immune system, and the
threshold to full-blown AIDS is crossed.305
iii. Genetic Variability
A high mutation rate and rapid replication frequency
combine to make HIV the most variable human virus known.306
The resulting genetic variability plays a central role in the
ultimate defeat of the immune response.307 It increases the
likelihood that highly virulent and drug-resistant mutants may
emerge in the viral population.308 Drug-resistant mutants may
be capable of evading the effects of anti-retroviral therapies
and vaccines,309 and virulent mutants typically accelerate the
pace of AIDS-defining diseases.310
305. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 62–65 (“Yet there comes a
point, usually after many years, when there are too many HIV variants. When
that threshold is crossed, the immune system becomes incapable of controlling
the virus . . . . [T]he variability befuddles the patient’s immune system, which
becomes less efficient and therefore enables the viral population to grow and
to kill increasing numbers of helper cells.”).
306. Id. at 60; see also Krista Delviks-Frankenberry et al., Mechanisms
and Factors that Influence High Frequency Retroviral Recombinations, 3
VIRUSES 1650, 1668 (2011) (“Retroviruses have one of the highest
recombination rates among all viruses. Frequent recombination reassorts viral
sequences to generate variants containing different combinations of
polymorphic sequences, thereby generating high diversity in the viral
population, which improve the odds that some variants in the population can
survive the ever changing selection pressure in the environment . . . .”).
307. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
308. See Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 65.
309. Delviks-Frankenberry et al., supra note 306, at 1668 (“[Genetic
variability through] recombination can also assort existing drug resistant
mutations to generate a more resistant virus or a variant that is resistant to
more than one drug.”); Letvin, supra note 257, at 15 (“HIV offers a uniquely
difficult target for vaccine development . . . . [A]n antibody that can neutralize
one HIV isolate may fail to neutralize another from the same individual. Such
an extraordinary degree of genetic diversity among HIV isolates
immeasurably complicates the process of HIV vaccine development.”); Louis
M. Mansky, Retrovirus Mutation Rates and Their Role in Genetic Variation, 79
J. GEN. VIROLOGY 1337, 1337 (1998) (“[The genetic variation of HIV] has
important implications not only on virus diversity and evolution, but also on
virulence, pathogenesis and the ability to develop effective antiviral drugs and
vaccines.”).
310. See, e.g., Delviks-Frankenberry et al., supra note 306, at 1668 (stating
that high diversity in the viral population “improve[s] the odds that some
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iv. Latency
HIV defends itself against the immune response by
creating “cellular hideouts” and establishing proviral
latency.311 It establishes latency in some cells within days to
weeks of infection, where it persists while shielded from the
immune response. 312 CD4+ T-cells are the major cells that
carry latent HIV, 313 but HIV can also be sequestered in
macrophages314 as well as anatomical reservoirs such as the
variants in the population can survive the ever changing selection pressure in
the environment”); Weiss, supra note 275, at 1276–67.
311. Sharon R. Lewin et al., Finding a Cure for HIV: Will It Ever Be
Achievable?, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 1, 1 (2011) (“In latent HIV infection, the
virus is able to integrate into the host cell genome, but does not proceed to
active replication. As a consequence, antiviral agents, as well as the immune
system, are unable to eliminate these long-lived, latently infected cells.”);
Susan Moir et al., Pathogenic Mechanisms of HIV Disease, 6 ANNUAL REV.
PATHOLOGY: MECHANISMS DISEASE 223, 228 (2010) (“The rapid establishment
and persistence of various HIV reservoirs remain two of the most important
impediments to achieving complete eradication of the virus in infected
individuals . . . .”); Peterlin & Trono, supra note 276, at 97 (“Not only does
[HIV] mutate rapidly and make its surface components difficult to access by
neutralizing antibodies, but it also creates cellular hideouts, establishes
proviral latency, remove cell-surface receptors and destroys immune effectors
to escape eradication.”).
312. Joel N. Blankson et al., The Challenge of Viral Reservoirs in HIV-1
Infection, 53 ANNUAL REV. MED. 557, 563 (2002) (“The persistence of [HIV]
infection through the long latency period of AIDS . . . demonstrates the ability
of HIV to avoid being eliminated by the host immune response.”); Johnston &
Fauci, supra note 37, at 888 (“Because latency is established very early—
within days to weeks after infection—the window of opportunity wherein HIV
remains vulnerable to eradication through the immune response is very
short.”); Vincent Piguet & Didier Trono, Living in Oblivion: HIV Immune
Evasion, 13 SEMINARS IMMUNOLOGY 51, 52 (2001) (“HIV can apparently hide
from cytotoxic T lymphocytes in at least two sites: the glial cell of the central
nervous system . . . and the resting T lymphocyte.”); H.C. Slavin, An Update
on HIV/AIDS, 127 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 1401, 1403 (1996) (“If living
conditions become too hostile for the virus, HIV can go into hiding.
Macrophages . . . represent a good hiding place and serve as a reservoir
because they can harbor large quantities of HIV.”).
313. Alessandro Marcello, Latency: The Hidden HIV Challenge, 3
RETROVIROLOGY, no. 7, 2006, at 1 (describing resting memory CD4 T-cells as
“the most prominent reservoir of transcriptionally silent provirus”).
314. Amit Kumar et al., HIV-1 Latency in Monocytes/Macrophages, 6
VIRUSES 1837 (2014).
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brain and gastrointestinal tract.315 Latent viruses may later be
reactivated.316 Latency during primary infection is unique to
HIV.317
In summary, HIV defeats the immune response with
unusual features that endow the virus with defensive
strategies to evade the human immune response, as well as
offensive strategies by which it weakens and ultimately
destroys the immune system whose very function is to defend
against it.
3. How Does HIV Cause AIDS?
HIV does not directly kill an infected individual—it
weakens and eventually destroys the immune system of an
infected person. 318 With little or no functioning immune
system, opportunistic infectious organisms invade the body and
latent infections are re-activated, causing diseases such as
Kaposi’s sarcoma, lymphoma and rare forms of pneumonia.319
These diseases are referred to as “AIDS-defining infections”
315. See Lewin et al., supra note 311, at 1 (“HIV can be sequestered in
anatomical reservoirs, such as the brain, gastrointestinal tract and
genitourinary tract.”).
316. Johnston & Fauci, supra note 301, at 2076 (“[L]atently infected calls
become activated, [and] produce virions that infect new cells before the initial
cells die or are cleared.”).
317. Id. at 2074 (“This aspect of HIV infection [latency] puts it in sharp
contrast with almost all other viral infections, in which the initial rounds of
viral replication do not establish a permanent reservoir of infection.”).
318. Ashley T. Hasse, Pathogenesis of Lentivirus Infections, 322 NATURE
130, 133 (1986) (“Immunodeficiency is the hallmark of AIDS . . . .”); Hermann,
supra note 18, at 64 (“AIDS is an impairment of the human body’s natural
immune system of defense against disease that renders a person vulnerable to
infections and various illnesses. The damage to the immune system [is] a
consequence of the infection with HIV.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38,
at 58 (“HIV replicates prodigiously and destroys cells of the immune system
each day . . . . [HIV] causes the severe immune impairment that defines full-
blown AIDS.”).
319. W. Kempf & V. Adams, Viruses in the Pathogenesis of Kaposi’s
Sarcoma—A Review, 58 BIOCHEMICAL & MOLECULAR MED. 1, 2 (1996)
(“Kaposi’s sarcoma remains one of the hallmarks of AIDS.”); Mike May,
Playing Hide and Seek the Deadly Way, 18 SCIENTIST, Feb. 2, 2004, at 16, 16
(“The person infected with HIV usually dies from . . . opportunistic
infections.”); Levine, supra note 19, at 424–27 (discussing how a microbe,
which does not cause illness in the average patient, would cause pneumonia in
an individual with an immunodeficiency, serving as a basis for an AIDS
diagnosis).
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because individuals with fully functioning immune systems are
rarely susceptible to them.320 When a person with an HIV-
weakened immune system is found to have one or more of these
opportunistic infections or has a T-cell count below a critical
level (200 cells per milliliter of blood), the person is diagnosed
as having AIDS.321 The natural course of HIV is “relentlessly
progressive,” and a spontaneous recovery is virtually unheard
of. 322 Most untreated people infected with HIV eventually
develop AIDS, for which there is no known cure.323
B. FORESEEABILITY OFHIV/AIDS AS A BLOOD-BORNE RISK
Blood transfusion is a very effective transmission
mechanism for HIV.324 Predictably, HIV-related injuries caused
by negligent ordering or administration of transfusions have
triggered numerous lawsuits.325 In litigation arising from HIV-
320. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The
principal opportunistic diseases of AIDS, such as Kaposi’s sarcoma,
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, [and others], are rarely encountered among
people who are not infected by HIV—so rarely as to be described frequently as
‘AIDS-defining opportunistic infections.’”); Hermann, supra note 18, at 63–64
(“Persons with AIDS are susceptible to contracting a number of diseases and
opportunistic disorders caused by organisms commonly found in the
environment but which are not harmful to a person whose immune system is
functioning properly.”).
321. Levine, supra note 19, at 424–26 (defining AIDS by the presence of
opportunistic infections); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 58 (“Patients
are generally said to cross the line to AIDS when the helper cell count, which
in healthy individuals measures 1,000 cells per microliter of blood, falls below
200.”).
322. D. R. Burton et al., HIV Vaccine Design and the Neutralizing Antibody
Problem, 5 NAT. IMMUNOLOGY 233, 233–36 (2004) (explaining the difficulty of
solving the neutralizing antibody problem); Johnston & Fauci, supra note 301,
at 2074 (“HIV infection . . . as a rule is relentlessly progressive, even though
only a small fraction of susceptible cells are infected at any point in time.
Virtually no person clears HIV infection.”).
323. Levine, supra note 19, at 430 (“By 1986 and 1987 it became apparent
that HIV infection was, in fact, a continuum of disease and that given enough
time, the asymptomatic infected individuals would eventually go on to
develop . . . full-blown AIDS.”); Simon et al., supra note 256, at 499 (noting
that a cure and vaccine remain elusive).
324. Herbert A. Perkins et al., Risk of AIDS for Recipients of Blood
Components from Donors Who Subsequently Developed AIDS, 70 BLOOD 1604,
160410 (1987) (estimating the probability of infection in an individual who
has been transfused with the blood of an HIV-positive donor is in excess of
ninety percent).
325. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tainted blood transfusions during the early 1980s, a crucial
issue before the courts was the defendants’ state of knowledge
of the risk of HIV/AIDS.326 Authorities differ on the point in
time when the medical community had reached a consensus
that HIV was a blood-borne risk. According to some, such a
consensus had not been reached until 1984, while others
believe it had been known as early as 1981.327
During the early stages of the epidemic while the risk was
ill understood, defendants escaped liability based on absence of
foreseeability. 328 In Quinones v. Long Island College
326. Joseph Kelly, The Liability of Blood Banks and Manufacturers of
Clotting Products to Recipients of HIV-Infected Blood: A Comparison of the
Law and Reaction in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and
Australia, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 465, 468 (1995) (“Some of the crucial issues
for litigation arising from transfusions between 1981 and March 1985 are: the
defendants’ knowledge about HIV/AIDS; when the defendants became aware
of the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission through blood transfusions; and what
the industry could have done to minimize HIV/AIDS transmission.”).
327. See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (“By January 12, 1984 . . . the national medical community officially
recognized . . . that AIDS was transmissible through blood and blood
products.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); LARA KHOURY, UNCERTAIN
CAUSATION IN MEDICAL LIABILITY 186 (2006) (“The risk of transmission of
HIV by blood had been known internationally since June 1981, and as early as
October 1984, the efficiency of heating techniques for treating blood was
recognized in the United States.”); LUC MONTAGNIER, VIRUS 9 (Steven
Sartarelli trans., 1st ed. 1999) (“[AIDS] was identified in 1981, and two years
later the causal agent was isolated for the first time.”); Alinka F. Baker,
Liability Without Fault and the AIDS Plague Compel a New Approach to
Cases of Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 81, 81 (1990)
(“Some authorities say that the medical community had not reached a
consensus that AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) was blood-
borne until 1984, whereas others say that there was substantial evidence of
that fact in 1982.”); Hermann, supra note 18, at 78 (“By the end of 1982,
evidence had developed that AIDS was associated with blood transfusions and
with the antihemophile factor.”); Mielke, supra note 37, at 3 (“Throughout
1983, the cause of AIDS remained unknown.”); Schader & Wainberg, supra
note 44, at 91 (“It was later that year [1983] that Luc Montangier and
Francoise Barre-Sinoussi isolated a suspected retrovirus which was later
confirmed to be the causative agent of AIDS by Robert Gallo in 1984.”).
328. See, e.g., Hicks v. City of New York, 204 A.D.2d 516, 516 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) (“[A]t that time it was not foreseeable that the blood might have
been tainted by the virus which causes Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome . . . .”); Bieling v. Battle, 434 S.E.2d 719, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the
plaintiff’s contraction of AIDS was not a foreseeable result of the blood
transfusion, because “the general medical community could not have
2015] FORESEEABILITY DECODED 391
Hospital,329 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York held that:
Even if it is assumed that negligent medical treatment by the
defendant hospital resulted in the decedent’s need for a series of
blood transfusions in 1980, we are in agreement with the trial court
that the risk of receiving blood tainted by the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus which causes the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was not a legally foreseeable risk at the
time in question.330
In Fox v. Estrada,331 Carol H. Fox underwent gynecological
surgery at Memorial City Medical Center in early 1982, where
she was transfused with two units of blood.332 In 1990, she
became ill and was hospitalized.333 While hospitalized, she and
her daughter tested positive for HIV.334 Carol Fox died in 1991
of AIDS-related complications, and the couple’s daughter died
five years later. 335 Carol Fox’s husband brought a medical
malpractice suit, as representative of the deceased, against
appellee, Dr. William Estrada. 336 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Estrada.337
The plaintiff appealed the court’s ruling that the
deceased’s HIV/AIDS was not a foreseeable consequence of the
negligently ordered transfusion. 338 The defendant responded
that the specific risk of HIV/AIDS was unforeseeable.339 The
plaintiff countered that the defendant’s liability should depend
on the foreseeability of the general risk of transmission of
blood-borne pathogens, not the specific risk of HIV/AIDS.340
anticipated in 1982 that AIDS was a natural, foreseeable risk associated with
a blood transfusion as such connection had not been made at that time and
was not a part of general medical knowledge.”).
329. Quinones v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 200 A.D.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
330. See id.
331. See Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *1 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at *2.
340. Id.
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The former characterization would be valid if HIV were a mere
variant of known blood-borne pathogens.341
The appellate court agreed with the defendant.342 It found
that at the time of the decedent’s transfusion the medical
profession was unaware of HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk.343
It held further that HIV/AIDS is distinct from known blood-
borne diseases such as hepatitis, Epstein Barr virus, and
malaria because of its unique behavior inside the body of an
infected person.344 Foreseeability should therefore be based on
the specific risk of HIV/AIDS and not the general risk of blood-
borne diseases.345 The risk so characterized was unforeseeable
and the defendant escaped liability.346
Eventually, when the medical community had achieved a
better understanding of the nature of HIV and the mechanisms
by which it causes AIDS, courts began to resolve the
foreseeability issue in favor of plaintiffs. 347 In Jeanne v.
Hawkes Hospital of Mount Carmel,348 Dr. Gerald Drabyn, a
plastic surgeon, performed elective breast reduction surgery on
the plaintiff, H. Chrystal, in early 1985 at Hawkes Hospital of
Mount Carmel. 349 During the procedure, Chrystal was
transfused with blood collected by the Red Cross on March 7,
1985 from an unidentified donor who was HIV-positive.350 The
Red Cross represented the blood as safe,351 and Mount Carmel
341. See id. (discussing how other blood-borne pathogens cannot be
compared to HIV because those diseases “do not have the devastating impact”
of HIV); see also Grady, supra note 22, at 127 (“The basic purpose of
reasonable-foresight proximate cause is to cut off liability for . . . accidents
that are not mere variants of those that were ex ante foreseeable.”).
342. Fox, 1998 WL 831666, at *4.
343. See id. at *2 (“The medical community did not reach a consensus that
AIDS was in fact transmissible by blood until 1983.”).
344. Id. at *3.
345. Id.
346. Id. at *4.
347. See, e.g., Snyder v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1048
(N.J. 1996) (finding that the risk that patients may contract AIDS via
contaminated blood transfusions is foreseeable, and that the defendant owed a
duty to use reasonable precautions to avoid such infections).
348. Jeanne v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Carmel, 598 N.E.2d 1174 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991).
349. Id. at 1175.
350. Id. at 1176.
351. Id.
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conducted no further tests for hepatitis, venereal disease, or
HIV. 352 It was later determined that Chrystal had been
infected with HIV as a result of her blood transfusion.353
Chrystal filed a complaint against Mount Carmel and the
Red Cross, alleging medical malpractice and negligence.354 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and awarded
damages of $12 million.355 The defendants appealed, asserting
that liability should be denied based on absence of
foreseeability.356 The appellate court confirmed the verdict for
the plaintiff, finding that “it was foreseeable that if a person
received a blood transfusion, one of the possible consequences
of the transfusion was that the person could get AIDS.”357
C. ANALYSIS
This section presents an analysis of the foreseeability of
HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk. The risk may be described as
infection by HIV and contraction of one or more opportunistic
diseases that define AIDS. The AIDS syndrome is defined by a
diagnosis of one or more of the following diseases: “(1)
opportunistic infection (2) Kaposi’s sarcoma (3) high-grade B-
cell lymphoma (4) AIDS-dementia/encephalopathy syndrome
(5) wasting syndrome . . . .”358
Common AIDS-defining opportunistic infections and
diseases such as cytomegalovirus infection, lymphomas
including non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, human T-lymphotropic
virus infection and toxoplasmosis were known and foreseeable
blood-borne risks before the AIDS epidemic. 359 This fact
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 1177.
357. Id. at 1178.
358. See Levine, supra note 19, at 424.
359. See sources cited supra note 19; see also Kempf & Adams, supra note
319, at 2 (noting that several blood-borne viruses are etiologic agents for
Kaposi’s sarcoma, including cytomegalovirus and the herpes virus
KSHV/HHV-8); S. Gerald Sandler et al., Retroviral Infections Transmitted by
Blood Transfusion, 63 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 353, 354, 356 (1990) (stating
that human T-lymphotropic virus is a blood-borne risk); Siegfried Seidl &
Peter Kühnl, Transmissions of Diseases by Blood Transfusion, 11 WORLD J.
SURGERY 30, 3133 (1987) (discussing diseases transmitted through blood
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appears to suggest that AIDS was a foreseeable blood-borne
risk even during the early stages of the epidemic. The general
common law rule is that the type of injury must be foreseeable,
rather than its extent or manner of occurrence.360 Courts in
early cases such as Estrada and Quinones nevertheless found
that AIDS was an unforeseeable risk of negligently ordered or
administered blood transfusions.361 The analysis in this Part
shows that the Estrada and Quinones decisions are consistent
with the Reasonable Ignorance of the Relationship doctrine of
proximate cause. Although AIDS-defining diseases were
foreseeable blood-borne risks even before the AIDS epidemic,
the systematic relationship between blood transfusions and
AIDS was (1) unknown to the medical profession during the
early stages of the epidemic, and (2) not a mere variant of what
was known and foreseeable.
The foreseeability issue in Doughty v. Turner362 turns on
analogous facts. In Doughty, the type of harm suffered by the
plaintiff (burning due to splashing of hot molten liquid) was a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s reckless handling of
the liquid, yet the defendant escaped liability. 363 The
systematic relationship between the defendant’s misconduct
and the plaintiff’s harm (splashing due to obscure chemical
reaction) was unknown to the defendant, as well as materially
transfusions, including cytomegalovirus and T-lymphotrophic virus
infections); Gary E. Tegtmeier, Transfusion-Acquired Cytomegalovirus
Infection, in BLOOD SAFETY & SURVEILLANCE 315 (Jeanne V. Linden & Celso
Bianco eds., 2001) (discussing the risk of spreading cytomegalovirus through
blood transfusions). The Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) can be transmitted by blood
transfusion and causes AIDS-defining diseases, including certain types of
lymphoma. See generally G. Henle & W. Henle, The Virus as the Etiologic
Agent of Infectious Mononucleosis, in THE EPSTEIN-BARR VIRUS 297, 297–307
(M. A. Epstein et al. eds., 1979) (discussing foreseeable blood-borne risks in
the 1960s and 1970s).
360. Intervening events between the defendant’s wrongdoing and the
plaintiff’s harm, however complex or bizarre, do not deny foreseeability as long
as there is no intervening tort or crime, and as long as the ultimate harm is
systematically related to the defendant’s wrongdoing. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text; supra Part III.
361. Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *1 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998); Quinones v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 200 A.D.2d 726 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994).
362. Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518, 518 (C.A. 1963).
363. Id. at 518.
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different from what was known and foreseeable (splashing due
to mechanical action).364
The analysis of the foreseeability of HIV/AIDS as blood-
borne risk focuses on the following issues:
1. A definition of the systematic relationship between
medical malpractice and HIV/AIDS that faithfully
translates the common law concept into medical science.
2. Whether defendants were reasonably ignorant of the
systematic relationship.
3. If defendants were reasonably ignorant, whether the
novel and unexpected element in the systematic
relationship was a mere variant of what was known and
foreseeable.
4. The stage of the AIDS epidemic during which the risk
became legally foreseeable.
1. Defining “Systematic Relationship”
The systematic relationship between a medical event and a
disease is defined by the etiology and pathogenesis of the
disease. The etiology of a disease is the cause or set of causes of
the disease.365 The pathogenesis is the mechanism by which an
etiologic agent produces the disease. 366 For instance, the
etiology of lung cancer includes carcinogens such as tobacco
smoke. 367 The pathogenesis of lung cancer includes
mechanisms such as the interaction of carcinogens with human
DNA to cause genetic changes that result in lung cancer.368
Thus, lung cancer is a foreseeable consequence of tobacco
smoke because of medical evidence that tobacco smoke contains
364. Id. (“[I]t would be quite unrealistic to describe this accident as a
variant of the perils from splashing.”).
365. SLOANE, supra note 25, at 268.
366. Fields, supra note 27, at 70; SLOANE, supra note 25, at 535
(“[Pathogenesis is] the cellular events and reactions and other pathologic
mechanisms occurring in the development of disease.”).
367. See Hecht, supra note 14, at 1194.
368. Id.
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an etiologic agent that initiates the pathogenesis of lung
cancer.369
HIV is the etiologic agent of AIDS. 370 It has unique
biological and genetic features that make it an effective agent
of the pathogenic mechanisms of AIDS. 371 Transfusion of
infected blood transmits the etiologic agent (HIV) that initiates
the pathogenesis of AIDS in the body of the recipient of the
blood.372 This establishes a systematic relationship between the
risk of HIV/AIDS and medical malpractice such as a
negligently administered or ordered blood transfusion. The
foreseeability of the specific risk of HIV/AIDS depends on the
medical profession’s reasonable knowledge of the systematic
relationship at the time of alleged malpractice.
2. Defendants Were Initially Reasonably Ignorant of the
Systematic Relationship
Defendants in early cases such as Estrada and Quinones
were reasonably ignorant of the specific risk of HIV/AIDS
because the etiology and pathogenesis of AIDS were unknown
to the medical profession at the time.373 Dr. Luc Montagnier
369. Id.
370. See Francoise Barré-Sinoussi, HIV As the Cause of AIDS, 348 LANCET
31, 31 (1996); Letvin, supra note 257, at 15 (noting HIV’s “etiologic role in
AIDS”); Jean L. Marx, Strong New Candidate for AIDS Agent, 224 SCIENCE
475, 476–77 (1984) (outlining compelling epidemiological evidence showing a
causal relation between HIV and AIDS); Jay A. Nelson et al., Role of
Opportunistic Infections in AIDS, 4 AIDS 1, 1 (1990) (“The etiologic agent of
AIDS is HIV.”); Schader & Wainberg, supra note 44, at 91 (describing the
isolation of HIV, “later confirmed to be the causative agent of AIDS”).
371. Weiss, supra note 275, at 1273 (“The overwhelming view is that HIV
infection is active enough to be directly pathogenic . . . and that the
epidemiological evidence for a causal relation between HIV and AIDS is
compelling.”).
372. See generally Anthony S. Fauci, HIV and AIDS: 20 Years of Science, 9
NATURE MED. 839 (2003) (looking back on the identification of HIV as the
etiological agent of aids and how it is spread via blood transfusions).
373. See Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *1 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998); Quinones v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 200 A.D.2d 726 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994); see also MONTAGNIER, supra note 327, at 115 (describing
AIDS as “an unforeseen epidemic that, indeed, could not have been foreseen
within the framework of traditional nosology [the classification of diseases].”);
id. at 108 (describing AIDS as “an illness [that] has no equal among human
diseases.”); Walter R. Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS, 98 PUB. HEALTH
REPS. 308, 308 (1983) (“By now AIDS has become quite well known through
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first identified and isolated the human immunodeficiency virus
in 1983 at the Pasteur Institute in France.374 In May 1984, a
team led by Dr. Robert Gallo at the National Institutes of
Health in the United States confirmed the discovery of the
virus and provided virological and epidemiological evidence of
the pathogenetic relationship between HIV and AIDS.375 Dr.
Jay Levy of California also independently isolated the virus
around the same time.376 Therefore, the defendants in Estrada
scientific publications and the mass media. But its cause is not known. Its
method of transmission is not known. And the ultimate measure of its toll in
deaths is not known.”); Robert C. Gallo & Luc Montagnier, The Discovery of
HIV as the Cause of AIDS, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2283, 2283 (2003) (“[A]t the
beginning of the 1980s, we had the essential tools required to search for a
retrovirus in this new and menacing disease called AIDS. But why search for
a virus, and specifically a retrovirus, in AIDS? The answer was far from
obvious in 1982.”); Levine, supra note 19, at 424 (“[D]uring the first three to
four years of the [AIDS] epidemic, the cause of AIDS was unknown.”); Jean L.
Marx, New Disease Baffles Medical Community, 217 SCIENCE 618, 618 (1982)
(describing AIDS as a “new disease of unknown cause and high virulence”).
374. Fauci, supra note 372, at 839 (“In 1983, experimental data indicating
an association between a retrovirus and AIDS were published by a research
team in France led by Luc Montagnier.”); Gallo & Montagnier, supra note 373,
at 2284 (“In early 1983, a clear-cut isolate was obtained in Paris . . . from a
patient with lymphadenopathy, a syndrome that was considered to be a
precursor of AIDS.”); Luc Montagnier, A History of HIV Discovery, 298
SCIENCE 1727, 1727–28 (2002).
375. Fauci, supra note 372, at 839 (“In 1984, the French group and
researchers at the National Institutes of Health, led by Robert C. Gallo,
published seminal papers that established, with virological and
epidemiological evidence, that the virus now known as HIV was the cause of
AIDS.”); Robert C. Gallo et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic
Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224
SCIENCE 500, 500–01 (1984) (“The increasing evidence of this disease, the
types of patients affected, and other epidemiological data suggest the
existence of an infectious etiologic agent that can be transmitted . . . . [W]e
and others have suggested that specific human T-lymphotrophic retroviruses
(HTLV) cause AIDS.”); Gallo & Montagnier, supra note 373, at 2285 (“[T]he
causative relation between HIV and AIDS was accepted by the scientific and
medical community in 1984.”); Schader & Wainberg, supra note 44, at 91 (“It
was [in 1983] that Luc Montagnier and Francoise Barre-Sinoussi isolated a
suspect retrovirus which was later confirmed to be the causative agent of
AIDS by Robert Gallo in 1984.”).
376. Fauci, supra note 372, at 839 (“The virus was also isolated
independently by Jay Levy in California from both individuals affected by
AIDS and asymptotic individuals from groups at high risk for AIDS.”); Jay A.
Levy et al., Isolation of Lymphocytopathic Retroviruses from San Francisco
Patients with AIDS, 225 SCIENCE 840, 840 (1984) (describing his discovery of
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and Quinones properly escaped liability if, in addition to their
reasonable ignorance of the risk, the risk was not a mere
variant of what was known and foreseeable. The analysis of
this issue is considered next.
3. Is the Risk of HIV/AIDS a Mere Variant of What Was
Foreseeable?
The analysis in this subsection shows that the systematic
relationship defining the foreseeability of HIV/AIDS as blood-
borne risk is not a mere variant of what was known and
foreseeable before the AIDS pandemic. 377 The etiology and
pathogenesis of AIDS both differ materially from those of other
viral diseases. The etiologic agent (HIV) has a complex genetic
structure and novel molecular mechanisms controlling its viral
gene expression that distinguish it from other human
viruses.378 The pathogenesis of AIDS is different as well.379
Professors Narayan and Clements describe the distinctive
features of the pathogenetic mechanisms of HIV.
The infection and diseases caused by the human immunodeficiency
viruses (HIV) are the antithesis of [the] general concept of
pathogenesis of viral disease. The incubation period of months to
years that precedes the onset of clinical AIDS, the chronic
progressive nature of the disease leading to cachexia and death, the
diversity of organ systems affected and the failure of people to
recover from the infection emphasize that there is a marked
HIV, noting that its “biologic properties and prevalence in AIDS patients
certainly suggest that [it] could cause AIDS”).
377. See Grady, supra note 22, at 114 (“The basic purpose of reasonable-
foresight proximate cause is to cut off liability for . . . accidents that are not
mere variants of those that were ex ante foreseeable.”).
378. See Eckstein et al., supra note 36, at 1407 (“In addition to the gag, pol
and env genes found in all retroviruses, the HIV-1 genome contains six
additional genes: tat, rev, vif, vpr, vpu, and nef. These genes confer upon HIV-
1 a number of unique abilities, including the capacity to infect non-cycling
cells.”); Fauci, supra note 36, at 617 (“HIV also has at least five additional
genes, three of which have known regulatory functions, and the expression of
these genes almost certainly has an impact on the pathogenic mechanisms
exerted by the virus.”); Johnston & Fauci, supra note 37, at 888 (“The
extraordinary mutability and resulting genetic diversity of HIV, which is
substantially more complex than that of other human viruses, also presents a
formidable obstacle to immune control.”); see also infra Part IV.C.3.iii.
379. See Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1618.
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difference between the mechanisms of pathogenesis of HIV and
those of viruses that cause acute disease.380
The unique nature of AIDS pathogenesis is directly
attributable to features that distinguish the etiologic agent,
HIV, from other disease-causing viruses.381 Three distinctive
features of HIV are (1) extreme genetic diversity, (2) a capacity
to infect nondividing cells, and (3) a unique genetic structure
and molecular mechanisms. These features, discussed below,
are material because they play a central role in the unique
pathogenesis of AIDS.382
i. Genetic Diversity
HIV is the “most variable virus known.” 383 Its genetic
variability is a powerful weapon against the immune
response. 384 It plays a central role in the persistence and
380. See id.; see also Mielke, supra note 37, at 4 (“HIV is indeed a unique
infection; it is able to directly infect specific cells of the human immune system
to produce immune abnormalities that lead to the development of
opportunistic infections, host compromise, morbidity, and mortality. The
retrovirus is able to directly infect cells of the immune system, especially the
cells that contain the CD4 surface receptors. The virus contains reverse
transcriptase, which is able to reverse the flow of genetic information by
converting RNA into proviral DNA that is incorporated into the host cell’s
DNA.”).
381. B. Bharati et al., Incidence of Bacterial and Fungal Co-Infections in
Some HIV Infected Indian Population, 3 INDIAN J. SCI. & TECH. 199, 199
(2010) (“The infection is alarming due to the unique pathogenesis of the virus
that decreases the CD4 cells, signaling the emergence of the opportunistic
infections, in the host.”); Clements & Zink, supra note 33, at 100 (“The unique
pathogenesis of lentiviruses is attributable to both their complex genetic
structure and the novel molecular mechanisms controlling viral gene
expression.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 60–62 (describing the
unique and difficult-to-verify process of HIV infection and disease
progression); Johnston & Fauci, supra note 37, at 888 (discussing the
“mutability and genetic diversity of HIV” and how that distinguishes the
virus’s development).
382. See sources cited supra note 381.
383. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 60; see also Bangham &
Phillips, supra note 39, at 1615; Johnston & Fauci, supra note 37, at 888
(explaining how HIV’s genetic diversity is a result of “extraordinary
mutability”); Schader & Wainberg, supra note 44, at 92 (“Unlike other
retroviruses, HIV-1 is extraordinarily mutagenic both within and among
patients.”).
384. See Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 59–60 (discussing how
HIV evades the human immune system through constant rounds of mutation
and replication).
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pathogenicity of HIV in an infected host by shielding the virus
from the immune response and increasing the likelihood that
exceptionally virulent and drug-resistant mutants may emerge
in the viral population.385 In the absence of such variability the
human immune response might be able to contain HIV
indefinitely.386
Three distinctive features combine to make HIV the most
variable human virus: (1) an error-prone HIV reverse
transcriptase enzyme that has no editing mechanism for
transcriptional errors, (2) a high replication frequency, and (3)
the occurrence of recombination processes between two or more
different HIV strains within the same infected individual that
enhances genetic variability of HIV.387
a. Error-Prone Reverse Transcriptase Lends to HIV’s High
Mutation Rate
HIV infects a host cell by integrating a DNA copy of its
genetic information into the genome of the host.388 This process
requires the action of the enzyme reverse transcriptase, which
385. Id. (“[Variability] increases the probability that some genetic change
will give rise to an advantageous trait.”); Zhuang et al., supra note 280, at
11,273 (“The HIV-1 genome is characterized by its rapid evolution, which
permits the virus to escape immune surveillance and to develop drug-resistant
variants as well as making it difficult to produce an effective vaccine.”).
386. Bangham & Phillips, supra note 39, at 1617 (“[V]iral persistence is
enabled, at least in part, by immune escape. If CTL escape could be prevented,
CTL responses might contain HIV indefinitely.”).
387. Id. at 1615 (attributing difficulty of treatment and prevention of HIV
infection to the “high rates of replication, mutation, and recombination of
HIV”); Emanuele Fanales-Belasio et al., HIV Virology and Pathogenetic
Mechanisms of Infection: A Brief Overview, 46 ANNALI DELL’ISTITUTO
SUPERIORE DI SANITÁ 5, 9 (2010) (“Variability is the most powerful weapon of
HIV, which allows the virus to overcome host immunity and the effects of
therapeutic (drugs) and prophylactic (vaccines) interventions. HIV variability
is a consequence of at least three peculiar features: 1) the ‘error-prone’
mechanism of action of the virus enzyme reverse transcriptase, that
introduces, on average, one substitution per genome per replication round; 2)
the very rapid viral replication, that generates a high number of virions per
day (estimated around 1010) in the infected individual and 3) the occurrence of
recombination processes between two or more different HIV viruses within the
same infected individual.”) (citations omitted).
388. Tang et al., supra note 58, at 135 (“The defining feature of a retrovirus
is its ability to convert its RNA genome to a DNA intermediate through the
virally encoded reverse transcriptase. A subsequent reaction . . . results in the
integration of this DNA molecule into host chromosome DNA . . . .”).
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copies the viral RNA genome into a DNA sequence.389 The virus
mutates during this process because reverse transcriptase is
error-prone and has no editing mechanism for transcriptional
errors.390 HIV reverse transcriptase is among the most error
prone reverse transcriptase enzymes known.391 This distinctive
feature of HIV contributes significantly to its hyper-mutability,
which plays a central role in the pathogenesis of AIDS.392
b. Genetic Recombination
HIV is a diploid virus: each virus carries two RNA copies,
“each full length and potentially able to replicate.” 393 All
retroviruses are diploid, but no other virus families, RNA or
DNA, share this feature.394 The two RNA copies in a retroviral
particle typically derive from the same parent provirus. 395
However, if an infected cell simultaneously harbors two
different proviruses, the genome of the progeny virion may
contain one RNA transcript from each of two different parent
proviruses. 396 When this genetically diverse virion
389. Id.
390. Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 59–60 (“The virus mutates
readily . . . because reverse transcriptase is rather error prone.”); Roberts et
al., supra note 43, at 1171 (“[T]he HIV-1 enzyme does not correct errors by
exonucleolytic proofreading.”).
391. Conlan et al., supra note 44.
392. See Mansky, supra note 310, at 1339 (“Reverse transcriptase fidelity
clearly plays the major role in determining the rate at which mutations occur
during the process of reverse transcription.”); Schader & Wainberg, supra note
44, at 92 (“[The] high infidelity of HIV-1 transcriptase, resulting in base
additions, deletions, and substitutions, may account for the observed hyper-
mutability of the AIDS virus. Today, HIV-1 reverse transcriptase remains the
primary scapegoat for drug resistance and viral adaptation.”).
393. Donald S. Burke, Recombination in HIV: An Important Viral
Evolutionary Strategy, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 253, 253 (1997)
(“Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-1, like all retroviruses, is ‘diploid.’
Each viral particle contains two RNA strands of positive polarity, each full
length and potentially able to replicate.”) (citation omitted); supra notes 48–49
and accompanying text.
394. Burke, supra note 393, at 253 (“No other virus families, RNA or DNA,
are diploid.”).
395. Id.
396. Id. (“Typically both RNA strands in a retroviral particle derive from
the same parent provirus. However, if an infected cell simultaneously harbors
two different proviruses, one RNA transcript from each provirus can be
encapsidated into a single ‘heterozygous’ virion.”). The term “virion” refers to a
complete virus outside a host cell. Levy, supra note 54, at 188. The term
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subsequently infects a new cell, the reverse transcriptase
enzyme, in the process of copying the viral RNA genome into a
DNA sequence, may switch back and forth between the two
RNA templates so that the newly synthesized DNA sequence is
recombinant of the two parental genomes.397 The process of
recombination thus enhances genetic variability of HIV within
an infected individual by scrambling the genetic content from
two different RNA copies to generate a hybrid DNA mosaic.398
The diploid feature of HIV is a critical factor in its high
recombination rate.399
All retroviruses generally have high recombination
rates,400 but the recombination rate of HIV is high even relative
to other retroviruses, making HIV the most recombinogenic
known human virus. 401 By some estimates the HIV
“provirus” refers to the genetic material of a virus that resides in and is able to
replicate in the genome of a host cell. See, e.g., id.
397. Id. (“When this virion subsequently infects a new cell, the reverse
transcriptase may jump back and forth between the two RNA templates so
that the newly synthesized retroviral DNA sequence is recombinant between
that of the two parents.”) (citations omitted).
398. An & Telesnitsky, supra note 49, at 195 (suggesting recombination
plays a larger role in HIV diversity than the high mutation rate); Terence D.
Rhodes et al., Genetic Recombination of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type
1 in One Round of Viral Replication: Effects of Genetic Distance, Target Cells,
Accessory Genes, and Lack of High Negative Interference in Crossover Events,
79 J. VIROLOGY 1666, 1666 (2005) (“Genetic recombination plays an important
role in the evolution of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1).
Recombination shuffles viral genomes and redistributes the mutations
generated from reverse transcription, leading to increased variation within
the infected host and, ultimately, the viral populations distributed throughout
the world.”) (citations omitted); Simon-Loriere et al., supra note 48, at 280
(“This process [recombination] . . . plays a central role in shaping HIV genetic
diversity . . . .”).
399. An & Telesnitsky, supra note 49, at 196 (“Retroviruses are so-called
diploid and virions that contain two different RNAs are described as
heterozygous. Co-packaging two RNAs in a single virion provides two
templates to the reverse transcriptase machinery and is a critical factor in the
high frequency of retroviral recombination.”).
400. See Delviks-Frankenberry et al., supra note 306, at 1668
(“Retroviruses have one of the highest recombination rates among all
viruses.”).
401. Jianbo Chen et al., Comparison of the Genetic Recombination Rates of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in Macrophages and T Cells, 79 J.
VIROLOGY 9337, 9337 (2005) (“HIV-1 . . . recombines at a much higher
frequency than other retroviruses; in one round of replication with two
markers 1 kb apart, the recombination rates of spleen necrosis virus and
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recombination frequency can exceed that of other retroviruses
by as much as a factor of ten.402 Recombination contributes
significantly to HIV genetic variability 403 and AIDS
pathogenesis.404
murine leukemia virus are 4.0 and 4.7%, respectively; in contrast, the
recombination rate of HIV-1 is 42.4%.”) (citations omitted); Terrence Rhodes et
al., High Rates of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Recombination:
Near-Random Segregation of Markers One Kilobase Apart in One Round of
Viral Replication, 77 J. VIROLOGY 11,193, 11,194 (2003) (“We found that HIV-
1 recombines at an exceedingly high frequency even when compared with
other retroviruses.”); Zhuang et al., supra note 280, at 11,281 (“[T]he results
presented here support the idea that HIV-1 recombines at an extremely high
rate of at least 2.8 crossovers during each cycle of replication, making this the
most recombinogenic process observed in any mammalian related system
described so far.”).
402. Rhodes et al., supra note 401, at 11,193 (“HIV-1 recombination can be
10-fold higher than that of other retroviruses.”).
403. See id. at 11,198 (“This observation indicates that recombination is an
incredibly powerful tool . . . to . . . generat[e] diversity in the viral population
and increas[e] the evolutionary capacity of HIV-1.”).
404. Burke, supra note 393, at 257 (“Many of the strains [of HIV] around
the world appear to have arisen through recombination, and it is likely that
recombination may be an important mechanism by which HIV evades drug or
immune pressures.”); Delviks-Frankenberry et al., supra note 306, at 1668
(“[R]ecombination can generate a[n HIV] variant to escape the host cell
immune response; similarly, recombination can also assort existing drug-
resistance mutations to generate a more resistant virus or a variant that is
resistant to more than one drug.”); Adewunmi Onafuwa-Nuga & Alice
Telesnitsky, The Remarkable Frequency of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Type 1 Genetic Recombination, 73 MICROBIOLOGY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
REV. 451, 472 (2009) (“The vast combinatorial potential of HIV-1 genetic
recombination presents one of the greatest challenges to preventing HIV-1
infection and combating HIV disease because it introduces genetic variation
that complicates vaccine development and promotes escape from antivirals.”);
Rhodes et al., supra note 398, at 1666 (“The inherent ability of HIV-1 to
recombine poses a constant problem for effective anti-HIV-1 treatment
because multidrug-resistant variants can be generated by recombining the
genome of singly or weakly resistant viruses. The increased variation caused
by recombination also hinders the development of effective vaccines . . . .
Therefore, rapid recombination of the HIV-1 genome creates a vast advantage
for the evolution of the virus and an enormous difficulty for the host.”); Megan
C. Steain et al., HIV-1 Co-Infection, Superinfection and Recombination, 1
SEXUALHEALTH 239, 239 (2004) (“Recombination may result in the emergence
of more pathogenic and virulent HIV strains with altered fitness, tropism, and
resistance to multiple drugs, and may hamper the development of subtype-
based vaccines.”).
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c. Replication Rate
Once integrated into a target cell’s chromosomes, the
human immune deficiency virus uses the cell’s own genetic
machinery to replicate itself.405 Newly created copies of the
virus are then released from the cell into the bloodstream of the
infected individual, ready to infect other cells in turn and
continue the replication cycle. 406 HIV replicates at an
exceptionally high frequency within a single infected
individual. 407 The high replication rate contributes to AIDS
pathogenesis by directly killing CD4+ T lymphocytes,408 and by
405. See SOMPAYRAC, supra note 261, at 59–60 (“HTLV-I enters its target
cell when its envelope binds to an unknown receptor on the cell’s surface, and
then fuses with the cell membrane. This ‘injects’ the viral capsid, which
encloses two copies of HTLV-I’s single-stranded RNA genome, into the
cytoplasm of the cell. There the capsid is removed, and a viral enzyme (reverse
transcriptase), which is packaged in the capsid, springs into action. This
enzyme copies the RNA genome to produce a single-stranded, complementary
DNA (cDNA) molecule, destroying the original RNA molecule after it has been
copied. The reverse transcriptase protein then makes a complimentary copy of
the single cDNA strand to produce a double-stranded cDNA molecule. The net
result of all this action is to replace the single-stranded RNA genome with a
double-stranded DNA ‘copy’ that contains the viral genetic information.”).
406. Id. at 60.
407. See Coffin, supra note 281, at 483 (“[T]he unique feature of HIV is the
extraordinarily large number of replication cycles that occur during infection
of a single individual.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 60 (“[A]t least
a billion new viral particles are produced in an infected patient each day.
[Researchers have] found that, in the absence of immune activity, the viral
population would on average double every two days. Such numbers imply that
viral particles present in the body 10 years after infection are several
thousand generations removed from the original virus. In 10 years, then, the
virus can undergo as much genetic change as humans might experience in the
course of millions of years.”).
408. David D. Ho et al., Rapid Turnover of Plasma Virions and CD4
Lymphocytes in HIV-1 Infection, 373 NATURE 123, 126 (1995) (“[O]ur findings
strongly support the view that AIDS is primarily a consequence of continuous,
high-level replication of HIV-1, leading to virus- and immune-mediated killing
of CD4 lymphocytes.”); Poeschla et al., Development of HIV Vectors for Anti-
HIV Gene Therapy, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,395, 11,395 (1996) (“[T]here
is every reason to believe that continuous, high-level viral replication is
central to disease causation . . . . The new estimates reveal a furiously
destructive process behind a facade of apparent clinical latency: approximately
1010 virions produced per day, 140 viral generations per year . . . .”).
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combining with error-prone reverse transcriptase and viral
recombination to enhance the genetic variability of the virus.409
ii. Capacity to Infect Nondividing Cells
In multicellular organisms, tissue grows and discarded
older cells are replaced through a biological process known as
mitosis.410 Mitosis is a form of nuclear division by which a cell
divides into two daughter cells with the same genetic
material.411 Most retroviruses can enter the nucleus of a cell
only while the cell is dividing.412 HIV, in contrast, possesses
genetic features that enable it to infect and replicate efficiently
in nondividing cells, 413 including immune cells known as
409. See Coffin, supra note 281, at 488 (“[T]he engine that is driving the
[immunodeficiency] process is the constant repeated cycles of virus
replication.”); Nowak & McMichael, supra note 38, at 60 (“HIV’s replication
rate further increases the odds that a mutation useful to the virus will arise.”).
410. See MARGIT PAVELKA & JÜRGEN ROTH, FUNCTIONAL
ULTRASTRUCTURE: ATLAS OF TISSUE BIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY 20 (2d ed.,
2010) (“For growth of tissue, development of organs, and maintenance of life
functions, both production of new cells by cell division and elimination of cells
by programmed cell death . . . are necessities. During the cell cycle, regulated
by cyclins and cyclin-dependent protein kinases, mitosis serves to equally
distribute all parts of the genome among two daughter cells.”).
411. Id.
412. See Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1620 (“In general,
retroviruses have a strong requirement for dividing cells; these cells
presumably provide optimal conditions for the synthesis of viral DNA and
integration of the proviral DNA. In contrast, lentiviruses replicate efficiently
in non-dividing, end-stage cells both in the animal and in cell cultures.”)
(citations omitted).
413. See, e.g., Eckstein et al., supra note 36, at 1407 (discussing HIV’s
“unique abilities, including the capacity to infect noncycling cells”) (citations
omitted); Philippe Gallay et al., HIV-1 Infection of Nondividing Cells Through
the Recognition of Integrase by the Importin/Karyopherin Pathway, 94 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9825, 9825 (1997) (“HIV[-1] can infect nondividing cells
because its preintegration complex is recognized by the cell nuclear import
machinery and actively transported through the nucleopore . . . . In contrast,
oncoretroviruses such as the murine leukemia virus and oncoretroviral vectors
cannot traverse an intact nuclear envelope, precluding integration in the
absence of mitosis.”) (citations omitted); Narayan & Clements, supra note 37,
at 1620 (“The effectors [enabling replication in non-dividing cells] are probably
encoded by the lentiviral RNAs in the small ORFs unique to these viruses.” );
S.C. Piller et al., Nuclear Import of the Pre-Integration Complex (PIC): The
Achilles Heel of HIV?, 4 CURRENT DRUG TARGETS 409, 409 (2003) (“Unlike
other retroviruses, HIV can transport its genetic material, in the form of the
large nucleoprotein pre-integration complex (PIC), into the nucleus through
the intact nuclear envelope (NE). This enables HIV to infect non-dividing cells
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macrophages. 414 Macrophages are white blood cells within
tissues that play an important role in the human immune
response. 415 Their role is to phagocytize (engulf and then
digest) cellular debris and pathogens, and to stimulate
lymphocytes and other immune cells to respond to the
pathogen. 416
The ability of HIV to infect macrophages is central to the
pathogenesis of AIDS.417 Macrophages are among the first cells
targeted by HIV following initial infection and play an
important role throughout the course of HIV infection. 418 HIV-
such as macrophages and microglial cells.”); Tang et al., supra note 58, at 154
(“HIV-1 Vpr also has a role in the nuclear import of HIV-1 preintegration
complexes (PICs) into the nucleus of infected cells . . . This makes Vpr an
important player in HIV infection of nondividing cells, such as
macrophages.”).
414. See Piller et al., supra note 413, at 409.
415. See supra note 51.
416. See supra note 51.
417. Ariberto Fassati, HIV Infection of Non-Dividing Cells: A Divisive
Problem, 3 RETROVIROLOGY 74, 74 (2006) (describing “how lentiviruses can
infect terminally differentiated, non-dividing cells” such as macrophages as
“central to HIV-1 transmission and AIDS pathogenesis”); Katherine
Kedzierska & Suzanne M. Crowe, The Role of Monocytes and Macrophages in
the Pathogenesis of HIV-1 Infection, 9 CURRENTMED. CHEMISTRY 1893, 1893–
94 (2002) (“Cells of the macrophage lineage play an important role in initial
infection with HIV-1 and contribute to the pathogenesis of the disease
throughout the course of infection.”); Stevenson, supra note 276, at 854
(“[T]here has been a growing suspicion that antigen-presenting cells, including
macrophages and DCs, may be central to the strategy used by HIV-1 to resist
immune and antiretroviral pressure.”); supra note 52 and accompanying text.
418. Kedzierska & Crowe, supra note 417, at 1894 (“Cells of macrophage
lineage are therefore amongst the first cells infected with HIV-1 following
transmission and subsequently contribute to the pathogenesis of HIV-1
infection throughout the course of the disease.”); id. (“Resident tissue
macrophages . . . are major targets for HIV-1. These cells are susceptible to
HIV-1 infection in vitro on the day of isolation.”) (citation omitted); see also
Carol A. Carter & Lorna S. Ehrlich, Cell Biology of HIV-1 Infection of
Macrophages, 62 ANNUAL REV. MICROBIOLOGY 425, 426 (2008) (“[T]he HIV-1
infected macrophage is of critical importance in the pathogenesis of HIV
because it is a major contributor to early-stage viral transmission, persistence,
and virus dissemination throughout the body of the host.”); Jan Mac
Orenstein, The Macrophage in HIV Infection, 204 IMMUNOBIOLOGY 598, 598
(2001) (“Macrophages play a key role in several critical aspects of HIV disease.
They appear to be the first cells infected by HIV and perhaps the very source
of HIV production when CD4+ cells are markedly depleted in the patient.”).
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infected macrophages serve as viral targets and reservoirs,419
support sustained viral production,420 facilitate pathogenesis of
neurological disorders, 421 resist HIV-mediated killing, 422 and
contribute to the development of AIDS-defining opportunistic
infections.423
419. See Kedzierska & Crowe, supra note 417, at 1893 (“Following infection
with HIV-1, monocyte/macrophages are resistant to cytopathic effects and
persist throughout the course of infection as long-term stable reservoirs for
HIV-1 capable of disseminating the virus to tissues.”); Weiss, supra note 275,
at 1275 (“Infected macrophages could be important reservoirs outside the
blood and as carriers of HIV to different organs.”); see also supra note 312.
420. Jessica Young et al., Selective Killing of HIV-1-Positive Macrophages
and T Cells by the Rev-Dependent Lentivirus Carrying Anthrolysin O from
Bacillus anthracis, 5 RETROVIROLOGY 36, 36 (2008) (“In particular, cells from
the macrophage lineage resist HIV-1-mediated killing and support sustained
viral production.”).
421. See Carter & Ehrlich, supra note 418, at 426 (“With the ability of this
cell type to cross the blood-tissue barrier, an infected macrophage cell is a
potent agent for delivery of HIV-1 to all tissues and organs, including the
brain.”); Fauci, supra note 36, at 621 (reporting evidence of macrophage-
induced neuro-pathogenic effects); Ho et al., supra note 408, at 282 (“[T]he
infected monocyte or macrophage has a central role in the pathogenesis of
subacute encephalitis.”); Kedzierska & Crowe, supra note 417, at 1899 (“HIV-
infected individuals are susceptible to neurological disorders . . . . HIV-
associated dementia is associated with massive infiltration of blood-derived
macrophages to the brain through the disrupted blood-brain barrier, and the
formation of multinucleated giant cells and microglial nodules. Both HIV-
infected macrophages and microglia are highly activated and produce a
number of neurotoxins contributing to disease progression.”); H. A. Smits et
al., Role of Macrophage Activation in the Pathogenesis of Alzheimer’s Disease
and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1-Associated Dementia, 30 EUR. J.
CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 526, 531 (2000) (“It is generally assumed that [HIV-
associated dementia] is strongly associated with immune activation of glial
cells, resulting in alterations of secretory functions. Many of these immune
products have been shown to cause alterations in blood-brain barrier integrity
and are able to induce adhesion molecules on macrophages and endothelial
cells, thereby enhancing monocyte transendothelial migration. Once inside the
brain, cytokines, reactive oxygen species and various neurotoxins can be
secreted by HIV-infected macrophages. Among others, TNF, arachidonic acid,
platelet-activating factor (PAF), NO and Ntox are proposed as neurotoxins and
these molecules may activate or directly damage surrounding cells. In
addition, HIV-infected macrophages have been shown to release chemokines,
which may result in an enhanced infiltration of HIV-infected as well as
uninfected macrophages.”) (citations omitted).
422. Young et al., supra note 420, at 36.
423. See Kedzierska & Crowe, supra note 417, at 1893–94 (“Following HIV-
1 infection, effector functions carried out by monocyte/macrophages are also
impaired, including phagocytosis, intracellular killing, chemotaxis and
cytokine production. Such defects contribute to the pathogenesis of AIDS by
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iii. Unique HIV Genetic Structure and Molecular Mechanisms
The unique and powerful pathogenetic mechanisms of HIV
are directly attributable to distinctive aspects of its genetic
structure.424 For instance, the genes that distinguish HIV from
viruses in its class—namely the tat, rev, vif, vpr, nef, and vpu
genes, the latter found exclusively in HIV-1—play a central
role in its high mutation rate and ability to infect and replicate
in macrophages.425 The tat and nef genes amplify and maintain
the replication rate of HIV, a key contributor to genetic
diversity.426 The rev gene has been described as “absolutely
allowing reactivation and development of opportunistic infections . . . .”)
(citations omitted); Narayan & Clements, supra note 37, at 1630 (“Since
macrophages constitute the main non-specific cellular defence system of the
host, lentivirus replication undoubtedly subverts this arm of the defence
system and results in failure of the host to eliminate the virus.”); Orenstein,
supra note 418, at 598 (“Macrophages play a key role in several critical
aspects of HIV disease . . . . [O]pportunistic pathogens can cause an
upregulation of HIV production by macrophages, often in the multinucleated
form.”); Stevenson, supra note 276, at 854 (“Infection of macrophages by HIV-1
occurs primarily through the CCR5 coreceptor and, although there are some
exceptions, individuals who lack CCR5 . . . are highly resistant to infection.
Therefore, macrophages or mucosal CCR5-positive lymphocytes may be
important in establishing infection.”).
424. Clements & Zink, supra note 33, at 100 (“The unique pathogenesis of
the lentiviruses is attributable to both their complex genetic structure and the
novel molecular mechanisms controlling viral gene expression.”).
425. Eckstein et al., supra note 36, at 1407 (“In addition to the gag, pol,
and env genes found in all retroviruses, the HIV-1 genome contains six
additional genes: tat, rev, vif, vpr, vpu, and nef. These genes confer upon HIV-
1 a number of unique abilities, including the capacity to infect noncycling
cells. Viral protein R (Vpr) in particular is known to play an important role in
facilitating infection of nondividing tissue macrophages as well as inducing G2
cell-cycle arrest in dividing T cells.”) (citations omitted); Fauci, supra note 36,
at 617 (“HIV also has at least five additional genes, three of which have
known regulatory functions, and the expression of these genes almost
certainly has an impact on the pathogenic mechanisms exerted by the virus.”);
Levy, supra note 54, at 188 (“Tat is a major protein involved in upregulating
HIV replication. Another viral regulatory protein, Rev (regulator of viral
protein expression), interacts with a cis-acting RNA loop structure called the
Rev responsive element, located in the viral envelope mRNA. This interaction
involves cellular proteins and multimers of the Rev protein and permits
unspliced mRNA to enter the cytoplasm from the nucleus and give rise to full-
length viral proteins needed for progeny production. Thus, Tat and Rev are
RNA-binding proteins that interact with cellular factors for optimal activity.”).
426. See Bangham & Phillips, supra note 39, at 1616 (“The kinetics of HIV-
1 replication are complicated by the regulatory genes, tat, nef, vpu, vpr, and
vif. The Nef protein is particularly important in maintaining the high
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essential” for viral replication, 427 in addition to its other
contributions to HIV functionality and pathogenicity. 428 The
vpr gene confers upon HIV the capacity to infect and replicate
efficiently in nondividing cells such as macrophages.429 The vif
replication rate of HIV-1—and therefore its pathogenicity—in vivo. Also, the
virus weakens the immune defenses by steadily depleting the CD4+ T cell
population . . . .”); Cameron & Kelly, supra note 55, at 26 (“[A] number of HIV
proteins interfere with critical cellular processes that facilitate the host
immune response. [T]he HIV Nef protein downregulates CD4 receptor and
MHC class I molecule expression. Specifically, the HIV tat protein impairs
antigen processing by interfering with proteasome function and
downregulating MHC class II expression . . . . Nef induce[s] apoptosis of HIV-
specific CTLs by increasing the expression of FasL, resulting in apoptosis of
Fas-expressing CTLs. This process is referred to as back-killing.”); Fauci,
supra note 36, at 617 (“The tat gene plays an important role in the
amplification of virus replication by encoding a protein that functions as a
potent trans-activator of HIV gene expression.”) (citation omitted); Foster &
Garcia, supra note 55, at 389–90 (“Nef is a pathogenic factor of Human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) . . . .”); Freed, supra note 55, at 29 (“Although in
general the effects of Nef deletion on virus replication kinetics in culture are
quite limited, it has been reported that in single-cycle assays, the presence of
Nef modestly stimulates virus infectivity.”).
427. Hope & Trono, supra note 56 (“Rev is absolutely required for HIV-1
replication: proviruses that lack Rev function are transcriptionally active but
do not produce viral late genes and thus do not produce virions.”).
428. See, e.g., Clements & Zink, supra note 33, at 100 (“The regulatory
genes tat and rev control viral transcription and RNA transport and
translation . . . .”); Freed, supra note 55, at 13–14 (“Rev plays a major role in
the transport of viral RNAs from the nucleus to the cytoplasm.”); Levy, supra
note 54, at 188 (“Rev (regulator of viral protein expression), interacts with a
cis-acting RNA loop structure called the Rev responsive element, located in
the viral envelope mRNA. This interaction involves cellular proteins and
multimers of the Rev protein and permits unspliced mRNA to enter the
cytoplasm from the nucleus and give rise to full-length viral proteins needed
for progeny production . . . . Rev [is an] RNA-binding [protein] that interact[s]
with cellular factors for optimal activity.”); Shehu-Xhilaga & Oelrichs, supra
note 57, at 10 (“[T]he Rev responsive element, within the coding region for
gp41, interacts with the Rev protein to assist export of spliced RNA
transcripts from the nucleus of the cell.”) (citations omitted).
429. See Eckstein et al., supra note 36, at 1407 (“Viral protein R (Vpr) in
particular is known to play an important role in facilitating infection of
nondividing tissue macrophages as well as inducing G2 cell cycle arrest in
dividing T cells.”) (citations omitted); Mansky, supra note 58, at 398 (“Vpr has
been found to act intracellularly to influence productive infection and latency,
to influence HIV-1 transcription, to inhibit proliferation and activation of cell
differentiation in a human muscle cell line, to interact with cellular proteins,
to prevent cell proliferation during chronic infection, and to be involved in the
nuclear localization of HIV-1 DNA in nondividing cells.”); Tang et al., supra
note 58, at 154 (“HIV-1 Vpr also has a role in the nuclear import of HIV-1
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and vpu genes also play important roles in the pathogenicity of
HIV.430
VI. SUMMARY
The analysis presented shows that the risk of HIV/AIDS
was unforeseeable in the early stages of the epidemic.431 The
etiology and pathogenesis of AIDS were discovered only in 1983
and 1984, respectively.432 Furthermore, the risk was not a mere
variant of what was known and foreseeable. HIV has a complex
genetic structure and novel molecular mechanisms controlling
its viral gene expression that distinguish it from other human
viruses. These distinctive features are material because they
confer on HIV unique characteristics that play a central role in
the distinctive pathogenesis of AIDS, a pathogenesis that the
human immune response can neither contain nor defeat.433
This analysis supports the common law evolution of the
foreseeability issue in HIV/AIDS blood transfusion cases.
Courts in early cases such as Quinones v. Long Island College
preintegration complexes (PICs) into the nucleus of infected cells . . . . This
makes Vpr an important player in HIV infection of nondividing cells, such as
macrophages.”).
430. See Balliet et al., supra note 60, 629 (“Although the specific
mechanisms of [nef] are largely yet undefined, [findings] suggest a critical role
in macrophage infection, which is central in the pathogenesis of HIV infection
and in neurological and pulmonary sequelae.”); Freed, supra note 55, at 29
(“Vif mutation can cause profound defects in virus infectivity . . . . Nef plays
an important positive role in lentiviral pathogenesis.”); Sakai et al., supra note
59, at 5770 (“Vif is required for rapid infection with HIV-1. Since vif viruses
infect cells faster than their vif mutant counterparts, Vif function may be
required to establish conditions necessary for the typically rapid HIV-1
infection in vitro.”); Shehu-Xhilaga & Oelrichs, supra note 57, at 11 (“Viral
proteins perform a variety of roles to subvert normal cellular function and
facilitate viral replication . . . . Vpu promotes degradation of CD4 in the
endoplasmic reticulum and Vif is necessary for subsequent efficient infectivity
of the newly produced viral particles. Vif counteracts cytidine deaminases
(enzymes present especially in macrophages and T cells) that are naturally
occurring host defense mechanisms against retroviruses. These proteins
include APOBEC3G and APOBEC3F and are degraded by HIV.”) (citations
omitted).
431. See generally Robert C. Gallo, Historical Essay: The Early Years of
HIV/AIDS, 298 SCIENCE 1728 (2002).
432. Id. at 1729.
433. See Tersmette, supra note 259, at 37–38 (discussing in detail the
pathogenesis of HIV infection).
2015] FORESEEABILITY DECODED 411
Hospital434 and Fox v. Estrada435 held that HIV/AIDS is not a
foreseeable blood-borne risk.436 Eventually, after scientists had
isolated the virus and discovered the pathogenesis of AIDS,
courts began to resolve the foreseeability issue in favor of
plaintiffs.437
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the foreseeability doctrine in
negligence cases where a new technology or unexplored
scientific principle contributed to a plaintiff’s harm. The issue
is governed by the Reasonable Ignorance of the Relationship
doctrine of proximate cause. The doctrine allows a defendant to
escape liability if scientists were ex ante reasonably ignorant of
the risk that caused the plaintiff’s harm.
The main contributions of this Article are the following:
434. Quinones v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 607 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
435. Fox v. Estrada, No. 14-97-00821-CV, 1998 WL 831666, at *1 (Tex.
App. Dec. 3, 1998).
436. Id. at *3 (“The summary judgment proof established that the blood-
borne pathogens known to exist in 1982 were treatable, rarely fatal, and did
not present the same magnitude of danger to the patient as HIV/AIDS. Blood
transfusions had been an accepted life-saving medical practice for many
decades, and there was no indication that a killer of the order of HIV/AIDS
was lurking in the nation’s blood supply. Accordingly, we will not impose an
obligation on the medical community in general, and Dr. Estrada in
particular, to have anticipated the possibility of so devastating a disease as
AIDS.”); Quinones, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 104 (“Even if it is assumed that negligent
medical treatment by the defendant hospital resulted in the decedent’s need
for a series of blood transfusions in 1980, we are in agreement with the trial
court that the risk of receiving blood tainted by the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus which causes the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was
not a legally foreseeable risk at the time in question.”) (citation omitted).
437. See, e.g., Snyder v. American Ass’n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036,
1048 (N.J. 1996) (finding that the risk that patients may contract AIDS via
contaminated blood transfusions is foreseeable, and that the defendant owed a
duty to use reasonable precautions to avoid such infections).
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1. It presents an analysis of the common law foundations
of the Reasonable Ignorance of the Relationship doctrine.
2. It proposes a translation into medical science of the
doctrine of foreseeability that preserves its common law
meaning.
3. It presents an analysis of the foreseeability of
HIV/AIDS as a blood-borne risk. The analysis illustrates
the application of the Reasonable Ignorance doctrine to
novel issues in medical science.
